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ABSTRACT
"Red Alert in Cyberspace": A Battle Over 
First Amendment Privileges 
on the Internet
by
Derek M. Belt
Dr. Jerry SLmich, Examination Committee Chair 
Professor of Political Science 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
This paper covers Internet communication and the ability of consenting 
adults to freely and openly express ideas regardless of content, especially w hen 
dealing with obscene and indecent materials. The first chapter focuses on the 
inability of the American courts to specifically define what obscenity is and 
exactly where it falls w ithin the realm  of First Am endment protection. In that 
chapter, I discuss the theoretical backdrop for the entire obscenity issue. The 
second chapter focuses on the governm ental attem pt to regulate Internet 
communications, focusing on the Com munications Decency Act of 1996. The 
final chapter covers the July 1997 Suprem e Court's deliberation on Reno v. ACLU  
(1997). The Court's opinion will stand  well into the next century.
Ill
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CHAPTER 1
OBSCENITY OUR LEGAL DILEMMA: A CLOSER LOOK 
AT THE U.S. SUPREME COURT'S ATTEMPTS 
TO DEFINE OBSCENITY
INTRODUCTION
"More than any o ther provision of the Bill of Rights, the First Amendment 
reflects vital attributes of the American character."' Any intrusion against the 
First Amendment is regarded as an unw arranted invasion upon the most 
endearing freedoms granted by our forefathers-the freedoms of speech, religion, 
and assembly which are am ong our most cherished cultural heritages. Free 
speech is symbolic of our "social commitment to the value of individual freedom 
and autonom y."' It is im portant to understand in w hat respect the United States
Bollinger, Lee C. "Images of a Free Press" in Hall, Kermit L., ed., Tlie Oxford 
Companion to Tlie Supreme Court o f the United States. (Oxford, England; Oxford 
University Press,1992), 297.
- Ibid, 298.
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Supreme C ourt views ou r most cherished Amendment. There is a m isguided 
notion tha t all speech retains some protection under the First Amendment. This 
is not true. This chapter will analyze one kind of speech often viewed as 
borderline or outside the purview of the First Am endm ent- obscenity. This 
chapter will also consider the theoretical argum ents for and against governm ent 
censorship in the area of obscenity. H ow  have the courts, the United States 
Supreme C ourt in particular, viewed the obscenity issue? Has obscenity been 
defined, is the definition clear enough for use by the courts? How do these views 
affect obscenity's quasi-unprotective status for future First A m endm ent 
applications?
Subsequent chapters in this thesis will go into more detail about applying 
these First A m endm ent obscenity standards to the Com munications Decency Act 
(1996) and  to the extent these restrictions concern the Internet.
There are two com peting theories to the application of the First 
Amendment. The liberal view portrays the First Am endm ent as "content neutral 
-  which stipulates that the governm ent has no pow er to restrict expression 
because of its message its ideas, or subject matter."^ This view envisions that the 
Framers believed that a democratic system  required open and frank discussion. 
This liberal standard  w ould  believe that we live in a society w here all
' Ibid, 891.
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participants in any sort of discourse are completely content unbiased. This is not 
the circumstance at all. People bring their ow n perspectives, backgrounds and 
moral criteria to all social interactions. To argue that som e people would not be 
offended when certain subjects -such as race, sex, religion, obscenity, etc, come 
up in conversation, would be naive. W hat is offensive to one may not be 
offensive to another. Therefore it is im portan t to take into consideration the 
freedom  of expression for the individual against w hat society on the whole may 
or m ay not consider unw arranted or obscene. In short, the liberal view believes 
that any intrusion against free expression should not be tolerated by any branch 
of governm ent and should be safeguarded by the judicial system.
So how does one take steps to protect and ensure that all the people can 
have som e meaningful interaction? The American courts have not subscribed to 
the liberal view of free speech. In fact, American courts have taken a more 
pragm atic view of First A m endm ent principles.
The pragmatic theory of free speech argued that language should not be 
regarded as outright conclusive. Rather, there should be "a balancing between 
individual and societal rights which seem s a logical compromise between those 
who w ould brook no governm ental regulation of the First Amendment" and
R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
those who believe that some governmental regulation saves us from all possible 
lewd and obscene comments being brokered in everyday conversation/
There are key academic advocates of this m iddle ground approach. 
Among them  Professor Zechariah Chafee Jr., who adm itted there are "two kinds 
of interests on free speech. The individual interest, the need of the many m en to 
express their opinions on matters vital to them if life is to be w orth  living, and 
social interest in the attainment of truth, so that the country m ay not only adopt 
the wisest course of action but carry it out in the wisest way."'' Another 
supporter of balancing was Thomas 1. Emerson, w ho stated that there is "a 
precarious balance between a healthy cleavage and  a necessary consensus, and 
that it is essential not to neglect the individual in order to preserve a stable 
comm unity in the face of ever-changing political, economic, and  social
circumstances. "
The pragm atic theory argued that speech such as libel, obscenity, and
 ^Abraham, H enry J. "Freedom of the Court" in Hall, Kermit L., ed. The Oxford 
Companion to The Supreme Court of the United States. (Oxford, England; Oxford 
University Press, 1992), 300.
Chafee, Zechariah Jr. Free Speech in the United States. (Boston, Massachusetts; 
H arvard University Press, 1941), 33.
Emerson, Thomas 1. The System o f Freedom of Expression. (New York, New York; 
Random House, Vintage Books, 1970), 7.
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fighting words (words likely to trigger a violent reaction) should not and will not 
be protected by the First Amendment. "The pragmatic free speech principle rests 
on two fundamental tenets: 1) that free speech serves special and significant 
constitutional purposes 2) that the First Amendment should not protect all 
speech but only speech of a certain quality.'" Unfortunately, the only way that to 
ensure that societal mores are to be protected is to legislate restrictions on speech 
favoring societal values over the individual's right to that speech.
The problem with regulating speech is that it raises serious ethical 
questions. One major "problem  w ith freedom of expression is that the 
government should not decide w hat expression has value; rather there should be 
a free market place of ideas."* There are questions; such as who in government 
is best qualified to regulate or censure speech- Congress, the State legislatures, 
the President, or the U.S. Suprem e Court? Should the governm ent err on the 
side of the individual or society? Just because any one set of citizens may find 
some material offensive doesn 't mean that all the citizens of a given society 
would. As anyone can see, a very precarious situation develops w hen deciding 
whose rights wins out.
The suppression of freedom  should never be an easy task. Thomas M.
'  Ibid, 891.
* Greenwalt, Kent. Fighting Words: Individuals, Communities, and Liberties of 
Speech. (Princeton University, New Jersey; Princeton University Press, 1995), 
102.
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Cooley proclaim ed that any encroachm ent on free speech endangers both "the 
developm ent and liberty'’ of the individual and the stability of representative 
governm ent."’ This slippery slope argum ent contends that the m inority or the 
majority should not dictate what should be considered valuable and valueless 
speech.
Robert Bork, however, argued in his book Slouching Tow ards Gomorrah: 
M odem  Liberalism and American Decline, that regulating speech is essential.
He stated that there is an ongoing dissolution of American values as seen in 
contem porary art, music and public dialogue and it is essential to save the 
American cultural dynamic from mediocrity.
Robert Nagel argued that som e state interests in regulating speech are 
legitimate because some violent crime and sexual deviance can be correlated 
w ith speech m aterial that is offensive to the public in general.'® This far more 
conservative stance argued that we have given too much to the individual and  
are neglecting societal interests and should alter our views accordingly.
"Censorship does seem more common than we usually like to admit; 
although labeled differently its substance even appears in the decisions of the
’ Biskupic, Joan and Elder Witt. Congressional Quarterly's Guide to the U.S.
Supreme Court. Third Edition. Volume 1. (W ashington D.C.; Congressional 
Q uarterly Inc., 1996), 409.
'® Nagel, Robert F. Judicial Power and American Character: Censoring Ourselves in an 
Anxious Age. (Oxford, England; Oxford University Press, 1994), 85.
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7most respected branch of governm ent," that being the U.S. Suprem e Court.” 
There a re  several reasons why the Suprem e Court m ust broker the obscenity 
question:
1) Often Congress attem pted  to rem edy obscenity and  fighting w ords through 
legislation. Unfortunately the proposed law is over reactionary, for example, 
favoring broad bans against speech tha t the legislation may not have originally 
been intended against. Laws such as the Sedition Acts (1917-1918) to the current 
CD A (1996) err too heavily on the side of society over the individual's ability to 
freely express himself.
2) The failure of the Presidency to stop or slow these advances on  freedom of 
expression. Often the President follows the 'bandw agon ' euphoria of Congress 
for public relations gain and  uses the U.S. Supreme C ourt as a fail-safe device for 
ill-defined legislation.
3) The finality^ of the C ourt's decisions allows most debate to end within the 
Court's halls. Supreme Court Justices are life long appointm ents who are 
perceived to be above m undane legislative politics w hich gives the illusion of 
objectivity.
4) The C ourt's ability to refuse cases w ithout reason allows the C ourt to choose 
which laws really chafe against the Constitution a nd  allows them to correct or
Nagel, 119.
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throw  ou t bad legislation, w ithout worrying about the backlash of sp in  doctoring 
or grassroots political activism.
The historic view of the Supreme Court was that "obscenity is not within 
the protection of the First Amendment (except for the right to use it w ithin one's 
home) and the governm ent can suppress it w ithout dem onstrating a compelling 
interest in doing so ." '' The C ourt has reasoned that "obscenity is imm oral and 
that the standards of the community" outweigh considerations of the individual.
The C ourt originally relied heavily on the prem ise that "anti-social behavior 
correlates to obscene material such as adultery, homosexuality, and sexual 
perversion."'^ Therefore "suppressing such speech is based on the desirability of 
prom oting true beliefs"'" and instilling a moral community. The state essentially 
was legislating m orality as it saw  fit. This axiom unfortunately has unintended 
effects. First, this position shows that the state does not trust the individual to 
use correct judgem ent when quasi-protected speech applications arise and 
chooses to err on the side of society by providing blanket protection to those who 
m ay be offended. Secondly, legislating morality can make the individual an
12 Greenwalt, 101.
Schauer, Fredrick. Free Speech: A  Philosophical Enquiry. (Cambridge, England; 
Cam bridge University Press, 1984), 178.
Ibid.
Schauer, 75.
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unwilling target of tyraiuiy of the majority or of a tightly organized minority 
group with access to legislative mobilization through money or connections. 
Neither problem is very  palatable for those who believe in the strong sense of the 
individual.
There are classifications of speech used by the Supreme Court; the first, 
full value speech had  been determined as speech that falls outside the protection 
of the First Am endm ent altogether, the second, low value speech was seen as 
enjoying some protection, bu t considerably less than full value speech.'* This 
indicated that the Suprem e Court adheres to the principle that stresses societal 
values over the individual for considering the First Amendment and speech 
codes.
The courts have historically sought to identify what obscenity is and how 
it should be treated w ith in  the purview of the Constitution. Though the 
Supreme Court has failed to provide an  all encompassing definition as to how 
obscenity falls w ithin the First Am endm ent protection. This policy of ambiguity 
provided the Suprem e Court a chance to keep change the standards to keep up 
with societal norms.
CAN'T QUITE PUT YOUR FINGER ON IT -  DEFINING OBSCENITY
Much of the obscenity law in the United States has roots in England as 
stated in Regina v. Hicklin (1868) was "w hether the tendency of the m atter 
charged as obscenity is to deprave and  corrupt those whose m inds are open to
16Greenwalt, 104.
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such imm oral influences and into whose hands a publication of this sort m ay 
fall."'” Thomas 1. Emerson offered that the Hicklin standard "brought w ithin the 
ban of the obscenity statutes any publication containing isolated passages that 
the courts felt w ould tend to exert an immoral influence on susceptible 
persons."'*
The history of obscenity law  in America has roots that stems back to 
shortly after the Civil War. From roughly 1872 to 1934, the Comstock Act was 
considered the standard by w hich to measure ail obscene material. "In 1872, the 
Comstock Act was used to prohibit the use of the federal mail for sending 
obscene materials. This legislation gave the governm ent virtual carte blanche to 
enforce and prosecute the law." ' ’ This Victorian standard of obscenity w as the 
"driving force behind American courts in general about obscenity until the 
1950's."^
There were problems w ith  the Comstock approach. The failure of judges 
to expressly state w hy material should be considered obscene often resulted in 
m ost juries finding the contested material obscene. Most of the material
Biskupic and Elder, 452. 
'* Ibid.
” Downs, Donald Alexander. The Nezu Politics of Pornography. (Chicago, Illinois; 
The University of Chicago Press, 1989), 12.
-® Ibid.
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Il
contested in the courts was used in sexual education /' Regardless of genuine 
health concerns, the prudish  nature of late 19**' Century and early 20**’ Century 
juries could not really find any value in any obscene materials. The courts did 
have two exem ptions to the law: the first was "sealed private personal letters 
even if they contained obscene materials, secondly, classics such as the Arabian 
Nights, Tom lones, and O vid 's Art of Love," literary works w hich were 
perceived as having value placing them  above other forms of obscenity."
There w ere early attem pts to specifically define w hat term s such as 
obscenity, indecency and lewdness really meant for the Court in considering 
cases dealing w ith questionable material. Obscenity was defined as being 
"offensive to chastity and decency expressing or presenting to the m ind or view 
som ething which delicacy, purity and decency forbid to be exposed."^
Indecency was clarified as "the w anton and unnecessary expression or exposure 
in w ords or pictures of that which the common sense of decency requires should 
be kept private or concealed -  unbecoming immodest and unfit to be seen."'"' 
Lewd was seen as "given to the unlawful indulgence of lust eager for sexual
Gurstein, Rochelle. The Repeal o f Reticence: A History of America's Cultural and 
Legal Struggles oz>er Free Speech, Obscenity, Sexual Liberation, and Modem Art. 
(New York, N ew  York; Hill and W ang, 1996), 179.
-- Ibid.
Ibid, 180.
Ibid, 181.
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indulgence or incited by lust or incites lustful thoughts, leading to irregular 
indulgence of animal desires, lustful, lecherous libidinous."^ These words and 
their definitions were used in subsequent cases and  were a basis for w hat speech 
should be contested.
The Hicklin - Comstock approach was the standard  for judging obscenity 
until 1933. Eventually the Hicklin standard was contested because the precedent 
was being used against literary works that possessed educational and cultural 
value. In  1933-1934, a "federal district court. Judge Woolsey, held that James 
Joyce's Ulysses was not obscene despite the presence of pornographic 
p a s s a g e s .T h e  district court found that there was no intent what-so-ever to 
produce an im pure desire on the part of the reader. The same district court 
altered the Hicklin standard which allowed for m ore literary works that 
possessed "isolated passages that attem pted to exert immoral influence" could 
not be c h a lle n g e d .T h is  action was the first push to shed the old English 
standards of obscenity and give the obscenity issue a truly American point of 
view.
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (1942) began w hat the Court w ould  call the 
two level test. The two level test was the first fram ew ork for testing questionable
Ibid.
Downs, 12.
Biskupic and Witt, 452.
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material. This case w ould provide a watershed for free speech law. Forms of 
"expression such as obscenity, lewd and offensive speech, libel and now fighting 
words w ere not protected by the First Am endm ent."^ The Court surmised that 
"even if such utterances pose no clear and present danger they are no essential 
part of any exposition of ideas and are of such slight social value as a step to 
truth that any benefit that may be derived from them  is clearly outweighed by 
the social interest of order and m orality."'’ Chaplinski/ was the first case to 
develop a test that w ould  test First Amendment protection to all forms of speech. 
The C ourt clearly believed that there were certain forms of speech and 
expression that had m ore intrinsic value than others. "Chaplinski/'s two-level 
speech theory favored rational, civil discourse over indecent or highly 
provocative expression."'® This test showed how the Supreme Court perceived 
fighting words w ithin the context of questionable speech and suggested the 
Court's adherence to the more pragmatic application of free speech theory.
Roth V. U.S. (1957) became the U.S. Supreme C ourt's first true test for 
defining obscenity in judicial terms. This case concerned both federal and state 
obscenity laws. Several im portant issues were raised by this case. The case tried 
to determ ine if it was a violation of law to mail obscene, lewd, lascivious, or
Downs, 3.
Ibid.
'® “Unprotected Speech” in Hall, Kermit L., ed., 892.
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filthy material? Did obscene m aterial fall under the protection of the First 
Am endment? According to the Comstock Law, it was illegal to send obscene 
material through the mail, but now  the Court, led by Justice William J. Brennan, 
stated that obscenity, including both  pictures and  also written w ords about 
sexual relations, could also be considered under the Chaplinski/ test. Brennan 
relied on the Chaplinsky two-level approach and stressed that "obscenity is 
narrow er than pornography or sexual material in general. It is the material 
which deals w ith sex in a manner appealing to the prurient interest or impure 
sexual desires.""
Brennan proposed a test that would determ ine just w hat w ould be 
considered obscene. In his test he developed the 'comm unity standards premise' 
which m eant the "type of person the material appeals to" would determine if it 
were obscene or no t."  This test offered three criteria for deternriining obscenitv: 
"1) Obscenity appeals to the prurien t interest in sex. 2) It has no serious literary, 
artistic, political or social value. 3) It is offensive to the average person under 
contem porary comm unity standards.""
The decision in Roth affirmed several standards from past cases. First, it 
accepted and used the layered speech argum ent of Chaplinski/. It attem pted to
" Downs, 13. 
"  Ibid, 14.
"  Ibid.
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define obscenity as appealing to the prurient interest (IE. restless craving).
Brennan reem phasized the district court's findings of 1933 intended to keep
classic literary w orks from  being censored as well. Brennan also tried to
m odernize the Com stock approach by incorporating the term 'contem porary
comm unity standards' to adjust for the ever changing societal standards.
Although Roth answered m any questions, it also created new  problems.
The challenged w ork had to be substantial. There were conflicting 
definitions as to w hat p ru rien t interest means. Furtherm ore, the 
Court did n o t specify the geographic boundaries of the community 
standards no r say the standards were enduring ones."
An interesting adjustm ent to the Court's disposition on obscenity
occurred in Memoirs v. Massachusetts (1966). Massachusetts argued  that "Roth did
not protect John C leland 's 1748 pornographic novel Fanny Hill. However Justice
Brennan devised a new  three part test concerning obscenity and  literature.""
The three part test required that for any material to be counted as obscene
it m ust be established that: 1) dom inant theme of the m aterial 
taken as a w hole appeals to the prurient interest in sex. 2) the 
material is patently  offensive because it affronts contem porary 
community standards relating to the description or representation 
of sexual m atters. 3) The m aterial is utterly w ithout redeem ing 
social value.^*
This was the C ourt's attem pt to ensure that future literary w orks be given as
"  Ibid, 14.
"  Ibid, 15.
"  Greenwalt, 100.
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broad protection as possible and to further narrow the category in which literary
material could be challenged in court.
The 1973 case of Miller v. California created yet another new  standard by
which obscenity and questionable material could be judged. This 5-4 outcome
showed the highly controversial problems that the Suprem e C ourt confronted
when considering obscenity and exactly w hat the standards for judging it should
be. "Once again the C ourt was asked if state obscenity standards infringed upon
freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Am endm ent."'' This test consisted of
another three-step m aterial test:
1) w hether 'the average person, applying contemporary 
com m unity standards' would find that the work, taken as 
a whole, appeals to the prurient interest. 2) w hether the 
w ork depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual 
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law.
3) w hether the work, taken as a whole lacks serious literary, 
artistic, political or scientific value."
Chief Justice W arren E. Burger stated that "the majority in this case intended to 
exclude only hard-core materials from First Amendment protection.""
The Miller test once again adhered to specific previous cases and tried to 
add a little room  to the understanding of w hat obscenity is. Once again the
Miller v. Calijbmia (1973). February 1996. [article on-line]; available h ttp ://  
W W W .oyez.at.nw u.edu/ cases/72-862/; Internet; accessed 2 February 1998.1.
"  Ibid, 2.
"  Miller v. California (1973) in Hall, Kermit L., ed., 548.
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Court brought in the two-layered argum ent to provide a rational reason as to 
why obscenity was not covered by the First Amendment. It recognized the 
importance of the Roth standard  but adopted a crucial new application -  state 
laws could be used to consider obscene material as long as they rem ained within 
the parameters of the Miller test.
ARE OBSCENITY STANDARDS REALLY WORKING?
There are three basic problem s with contemporary obscenity standards. 
The Courts and  legislatures failed to tackle the most basic problem  of defining 
w hat was obscenity. Do any of the results truly justify suppression? Was it truly 
possible to enforce such standards at both state and federal levels?
The C ourt's history of obscenity judgements speaks for itself. The 
Comstock-Hicklin application to First Amendment theory of obscene materials 
may have been over broad and possibly damaging to unintended targets, yet it 
did  stand for 80 years with little or no alterations. During this time the Court 
strongly followed the pragm atic course of First Amendment application to 
obscenity following the Victorian cultural attitudes acquired from  England in 
both societal m ores and legal premises.
The Roth case propelled an already bad problem  into an abyss of 
bureaucratic red tape definitions. The prom ulgation of cases concerning 
obscenity indicates one change the counter-culture movement of the 1960's
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produced—an explosion of the pornography industry that was purposely aim ed 
at having society rethink the cultural morality that had been legislated against 
the American public since the Civil W ar through the use of the Comstock 
standard. Perhaps a century of choosing First Amendment protection in favor of 
the society over the individual w as too great no t to consider. The obscenity issue 
was reexam ined in a new light w hen contem porary Supreme C ourt Justices' 
thoughts on valuable and valueless expression were used to retest an old 
argum ent.
Conservatives like Robert Bork may find it easy to point a finger at the
counter-culture m ovem ent but the obscenity problem  can really be attributed to
the C ourt itself. The Court's vague definitions on obscenity, prurience,
com m unity standards and patently offensive clause causes there to be continuing
ambivalence on the subject of obscenity.
The Suprem e Court has never explained fully why obscenity 
falls completely outside of the First A m endm ent protection.
That determ ination has relieved the C ourt from looking very 
hard at the justifications for banning obscenity outright and 
from w orrying about the rule against content discrimination as 
it applies to such bans.'®
The C ourt's stand  was ambiguous, and it seem ed content w ith trying each case 
on its ow n m erits and in the tim e period which it is considered.
Is suppression of certain expressions and  speech really needed?
'® Greenwalt, 103.
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Suppression was "prem ised on the assum ption that it will be effective, that as to 
the opinion suppressed this opinion will be less accepted after the suppression 
than before."^^ One of the premises for early Suprem e C ourt views on legislating 
morality stated that obscenity w as immoral and  was the cause of subsequent 
crime. However, empirical evidence provided no clear cut basis for any causal 
connection between challenged speech like obscenity and sexual deviance or 
crimes. "It is only speculative tha t repressing obscenity w ould build a m oral 
community, in any event the ideal moral com m unity is not defined."^ 
Suppression should not be so broad as to deny conversation between consenting 
adults.
The last problem  with obscenity was the actual enforcem ent of the law 
itself. People who believe that obscenity law was vague a t best argue this is the 
best reason to keep governm ental regulation ou t of the First Amendment. They 
argue that there is no follow through  for existing anti-obscenity statutes. They 
provide seven legitimate reasons for Miller's failure to attack the problem of 
obscenity;
1) Low priority has been given to obscenity cases by prosecutors 
because of the scarcity of resources, prosecutors unfavorable 
attitudes and greater concern for other crimes. 2) Relative public 
tolerance of freedom  of choice in this area reinforces similar attitudes 
on the parts of juries and judges. 3) The definitional ambiguity of
■*' Schauer, 75. 
Ibid.
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Miller like obscenity case precedent. 4) The vagueness of political 
pressure. 5) Under complaining by the public to the police, under 
investigation by police, under-sentencing by the Judge. 6) Jury 
problems because they may find m aterial appealing to themselves.
7) Pom ographers and publishers of obscenity are experienced 
litigators (IE. U.S v. Flint).*^
The Suprem e Court has failed to define exactly w hat obscenity entails. It 
has stood by a several different standards all similar to the 1942 Chaplinsky 
decision. The Supreme C ourt continues to stipulate that there are levels of low 
value speech and expression which do not fall under First Am endm ent 
protection. Historically the Supreme Court has opted to err on the side of society 
by refusing to provide broad protection to materials that should not have been 
challenged in the courts. Yet, the incremental protections that occurred 
tfiroughout the Roth to Miller era dem onstrated increasing care when attem pting 
suppression of literary materials applied. Furthermore, to accommodate a 
rapidly changing society the Court adopted a flexible standard that specified 
'contem porary ' community standards as the position on  obscenity. However, it 
never stated where that community begins and ends.
Although the Supreme Court has far from closed the door on the 
obscenity issue, there are still perilous waters ahead that signify new challenges 
for the Roth and Miller tests. The new technology of the Internet sprang to life in 
the late 1980's and the conservatives began to rally anew  for reinvigorated efforts
Downs, 20-21.
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to stem  a new type of public discourse that represented "untram m eied, 
uncontrolled and wholly liberated ocean of information for obscenity and 
pornography." ** This occurred not in  a public assembly or news tabloids, but 
the virtual surroundings of Cyberspace. Another wave of pragm atism  spurred 
on by political conservatives, wanted to restrict speech in a way that speech itself 
had never been considered. This new  wave of governm ent intrusion upon First 
Am endm ent rights leaned even further towards broad societal protection and 
was to be considered under the new Communications Decency Act of 1996.
44 Bork, 135.
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CHAPTER 2
"RED ALERT" IN CYBERSPACE: FIRST AMENDMENT 
FIGHT OVER THE INTERNET
The newest medium, the Internet, provided the governm ent with another 
opportunity  to exercise its regulatory powers. Often these governmental 
responses to new  technology come a t a price of freedom of expression. The 
Com m unications Decency Act of 1996 (CD A) is an example of a m isguided 
legislative attem pt to intrude on the dearest p a rt of our Constitution, the First 
Amendment. The CD A attem pted to regulate transm ission of pornography to 
children, and regulate other expression by am biguously broad language used in 
the biU, that upon closer examination is unconstitutional. This attem pted 
regulation is nothing more than governm ental censorship of consensual 
comm unication through the Internet.
W hat is the Internet? The Internet is a global netw ork linking millions of 
com puters located in homes, businesses, and organizations across state and 
national boundary lines. The Internet provides a m edium  of communications for
11
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art, literature, business, information, local news, and  international 
debate. "The Internet presents a wide variety of m ethods of communication and 
information exchange and retrieval."'*^ Generally the Internet is arranged into six 
prevalent categories:
1) One to one messaging (such as e-mail)
2) One to many m essaging (such as list serve)
3) Distributed message databases (such as Usenet news groups)
4) Real time communication (such as Internet Relay Chat)
5) Real time remote com puter utilization (such as telnet)
6) Remote information retrieval (such as ftp, gopher, and W orld Wide 
Web [WWW])-^
W hat is cyberspace? The term  cyberspace describes the
place-without physical walls or even physical dimensions 
where ordinary telephone conversations happen, where 
voice-mail and e-mail messages are stored and sent back 
and forth, and where com puter-generated graphics are 
transm itted and transformed, all in the form of interactions 
-some in real-time others delayed-among the countless users 
and betw een users and  the com puters itself.^'
Therefore, the Internet is the actual connection of the com puter netw ork, and the
Lewines, Alan. "M aking Cyberspace Safe for Children: A First Amendment 
Analysis of the Communications Decency Act of 1996." 1996. [paper on-line]; 
available h ttp  : / /  w w w .dcez.com /~alew ine/
cda96/ cdadraft.htm l.#headingl7; Internet; accessed 26 August 1996, 5.
46 Ibid.
Tribe, Lawrence. "The Constitution in Cyberspace: law and liberty beyond 
the electronic frontier." The Humanist. Vol. 51. Iss. 5. (September-October 
1991): 5.
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term  cyberspace relates to the ambiguous arena w hich those transactions take 
place.
Thomas Jefferson recognized that
The liberty to exchange information—to vent, shmooze, even 
circulate gossip was to be so vital to the thriving of the American 
body politic that he once declared 'Were it left for me to decide 
w hether w e should have a government w ithout newspapers, or 
a new spaper w ithout government, I should not hesitate a moment 
to prefer the latter.^
Although Jefferson was not able to witness the unique nature of immediate
communication on  the Internet, certainly he would have included it. The First
Am endm ent should cover all forms of speech.
The spontaneous nature of the Internet and the transactions through
cyberspace present serious legal questions concerning the nature of regulation. It
has been argued that "differences in the characteristics of new  m edia justify
differences in the First Amendment standards applied to them."^^ These alleged
differences have resulted in layered degrees of speech protection, w ith the
printed w ord receiving the highest, broadest protection afforded by the First
Am endment, and transmissions that come into vour home via radio, and
SUberman, Steve. "Defending the First Amendment." 1997. [article on-line]; 
available h ttp :/ /  ww w.hotw ired.com / specia l/law su it/index.html. ; Internet; 
accessed 4 April 1997.
The Note." The Harvard Laiv Revieiv. March 1994. [journal on-line]; available 
h t tp : / /w w w -sw iss.ai.m it.edu/6095/articles/message-in-the-medium.txt.; 
Internet; accessed March 1997,1.
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television received less. Proponents of the CDA argued that the Internet 
represents technology more akin to radio, television and telephone and  therefore 
should be regulated accordingly under this precedent. Hence the broadcast 
analogy argument spawned in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC (1969).
It is important to recognize the timelessness of the Constitution and apply 
it to all forms of communication that technology will bring. "The Constitution 
m ust be read through technologically transparent lenses."^” Hence, new 
technologies afforded with the passage of time should not degrade the am ount of 
protection the First Am endm ent confers to the dynamic of individual or group 
speech values. Unfortunately, legislators rarely come up to speed w ith such 
developments in a timely m anner and often pass legislation fraught with 
problem s that fail to address this technological-legislative gap.
The contention that underlined all the cyber-related cases depended on 
how one answered the question of w hether the Internet should be considered as 
analogous to the printed w ord or some form  of broadcast medium? The 
proponents argued that it was more like the latter. Hence, much like radio and 
broadcast TV, which allows the FCC to regulate the Internet for material termed 
'indecent'. The opposition to the CDA believed that, because of its unique nature 
and public applications, the Internet dem anded the full protection of the First 
Am endm ent unfettered by any attem pts a t censorship or intrusion. The term
Tribe, 39.
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'indecent' provided yet another example of vague legalese that had yet to be 
defined, or provide a fram ework of what could be censored.
This chapter will provide a brief history of First A m endm ent related cases 
citing relevant decisions in the field of cyber-law to better understand the 
original orientation of the courts. Two questions in particular need to be 
considered. First, have the courts treated the Internet m ore like a broadcast or a 
prin t medium? Second, sort of regulatory m odel did the CDA represent? 
Argum ents both for and against the CDA will be studied. And finally, possible 
alternatives to the CDA wül be discussed.
BUILDING A FRAMEWORK OF UNDERSTANDING 
There are several cases that brought the Internet to judicial prominence. 
These cases were the basis for Congressional attem pts a t regulating the Internet, 
which prom pted the CDA. It is im portant to understand that obscenity, and the 
freedom  of expression via the Internet is not a new argum ent in the courts. A 
brief sum m ary of each case, followed by an explanation of the cases relevance 
will be addressed in this section.
The first case was Miller v. California (1973). A lthough, this had nothing to 
do w ith  the Internet it underscored the problem  of obscene materials and  First 
Am endm ent protection driven on  by an earlier Suprem e C ourt case, Roth v. US
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(1957). "Did the California anti-obscenity law infringe upon the freedom  of 
speech guaranteed by the First Amendment?"^^
The case started  w hen Miller,
conducted a mass m ailing cam paign to advertise the sale of 'adu lt' 
material, w as convicted of violating a California statute prohibiting 
the distribution of obscene material. Many unwilling recipients of 
Miller's brochures com plained to the police, initiating criminal 
proceedings under California's anti-obscenity law."'
The decision was appealed to the Suprem e Court and after a 5-to-4 decision, the 
Court ruled that "obscene m aterials d id  not enjoy First Am endm ent 
protection.""^ The C ourt established param eters to judge obscene material that 
was covered in C hapter One. This application had broad ramifications and 
spurred  several anti-pom ography acts through Congress. The problem  w ould 
be to apply Miller to the new m edium  of Internet communications.
Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc. (1991) w ould be the first true judicial 
attem pt at establishing a chain of responsibility for libelous statem ents occurring 
on the Internet. Com puServe, as an Internet provider, contained several bulletin 
boards meant to distribute messages for the various users that have certain 
interests. (For example: if you are interest is history, the user w ould connect to
Miller v. California (1973), 1. 
Ibid.
» Ibid, 2.
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the history bulletin board. There you 'd  be able to view various posts related to 
that topic. The user can even write to the bulletin board and  distribute whatever 
he feels about a certain topic.) Two competing corporations posted daily to a 
bulletin board sponsored by CompuServe called. Journalism Forum. A news 
bulletin dubbed 'Rumorville USA,' published by Don Fitzpatrick Associates of 
San Francisco was the source of the litigation.^
In 1990, Cubby, Inc. began publishing a competing newsletter called 
'Scuttlebutt'. Someone from  'Rumorville', perhaps concerned with the new  
competition, used the online bulletin board system to derail 'Scuttlebutt' by 
stating that it was a start-up scam, and implied that 'Scuttlebutt' was plagiarizing 
entire articles in an attem pt to underm ine 'Rumorville'. Cubby sued 
CompuServe and Fitzpatrick for libel. CompuServe, having never been notified 
of any trouble from 'Rumorville,' moved for sununary judgement, stating that it 
was a distributor, not a publisher, of the libelous material. "The court held that 
CompuServe was a distributor, not a publisher, since it d id  not attem pt to 
exercise editorial control over the contents of the information flowing through its 
network."”  This landm ark case recognized some of the unique characteristics of
'■* Wallace, Jonathan D.and Mark Mangan. Sex, Laws and Cyberspace: freedom and 
regulation on the frontiers of the online revolution. (New York, New York: M«ScT 
Books and Henry Holt, 1996), 85.
"Cases." 25 February 1997 [article on-line]; available h t tp : / /  www.seamless 
c o m /rc l/ things.html; Internet; accessed 9 May 1997. 1.
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the Internet. Spontaneity of the communications were considered different, 
because with the "w ritten w ord the publisher is presum ed to know  what it 
publishes, whereas the online distributor service can 't possibly be aware of the 
contents of everything that passes through a bulletin board.""*
US V.  Robert & Colleen Thomas (1992) was the first case that attem pted to 
link the state anti-pom ography standards that resulted from Miller to the 
Internet, and to define distributive responsibility for indecent materials."' The 
Thomas's company. Amateur Action Bulletin Board System (AABBS) was an 
Internet distributor of pornographic materials. They were investigated twice 
under California obscenity and anti-pom ography statutes and  found to be totally 
legal. A postal inspector posed as a potential customer, e-mailed AABBS for 
some potential child pom ographic materials. He found no m aterial proof that 
could be prosecuted in California. The postal inspector refused to come up 
em pty so he sim ply repeated his request for pom ographic materials from a state 
that would easily find any pom ographic material offensive. The case was 
brought up in Memphis, Tennessee, where the state pom ography laws are 
am ong the toughest in the nation. The prosecution argued that "com puter
-* Wallace, and Mangan, 85.
US V.  Robert & Colleen Thomas (1992). [article on-line]; available h ttp : / /  
w w w .epic.org/free_speech/ censorship/us v thomas.html ; Intemet; accessed 
2 February 1998.
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technology does not require a redefinition of comm unity", as cited in Miller7^  A 
disjointed defense effort kept switching between the voluntary nature of the 
pom ographic service and  the fact that the Intem et d id  require a redefinition of 
what was considered community. It w as argued that "everything found on the 
bulletin board  could have been acquired on any street in San Francisco."^’ The 
application of this dual standard of the conununity values to pom ographic 
materials provided legal questions that had not been previously raised.
The Thomas's w ere convicted of interstate pom ography trafficking. Yet, 
the conviction raised m ore questions than  answers. Does new technology 
require redefining comm unity? Why d id  the defense ignore a freedom  of 
expression argum ent? If the anti-pom ography laws are reasonable from state to 
state why transfer this particular case? Who determines vulgar m aterial, your 
community or one tha t you do not reside in? All these questions w ould 
eventually haunt governm ental regulatory attempts.
A case that brought some fireworks to the cyber-scene w as US v. Jake Baker 
& Arthur Gonda (1995). A sophomore a t University of Michigan, Jake Baker 
provided imaginative, yet disturbing narrative tales of rape and torture on a 
popular Usenet site called alt.sex.stories. These stories often docum ented the
Wallace, and M angan, 32.
Reske, H enry J. "C om puter pom  a prosecutorial challenge; Cyberspace smut 
easy to distribute, difficult to track, open to legal questions." ABA Journal. 
Vol. 80. (December 1994): 40.
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stalking, abduction, rape, torture, abuse and even m urder of various women. He 
gained instant popularity with his stories and  became the talk of sex Usenet 
groups. Baker's last attem pt at notoriety, term ed "Doe," was posted January 9, 
1995, about a girl w ith  whom he shared  a language class. University of Michigan 
started an investigation after it had been brought to their attention. What had 
been the most disturbing developm ent is that while Baker had been writing his 
stories he had been contacted via e-mail by A rthur Gonda to possibly meet and  
talk about planning a real life scenario that resem bled Baker's stories. The 
university summarily suspended Jake Baker and  then set out to prosecute him, 
while the search commenced for A rthur Gonda.
Although the case seemed to highlight a disturbed individual, there were 
underlying moral questions that w ere eventually brought out. The brutality and 
the vulgarity of the writings were not the real issues on trial, m uch to the chagrin 
of the prosecution. The failure to prove harm  or eventual harm  became a key 
problem  with the prosecutions case as cited by Judge Cohn, w ho stated these 
w orks were "offensive but not an im m inent threat to anyone. People should not 
have to stand trial for private thoughts and fantasies."*” An ACLU lawyer filed 
to dismiss the case based on Whitney v. California (1927). In tha t case the court 
held that "fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech. 
To justify suppression of free speech there m ust be reasonable ground to fear
*” Wallace and Mangan, 80.
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that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable 
ground to believe that the danger apprehended is irnminent."*' W hat was 
perhaps best established in this case was that the governm ent did not have a 
right to censor w hat it felt were inappropriate or explicit stories on  the Intemet. 
This provided legislators w ith some eventual am m unition that w ould be applied 
to CDA.
PROS OF THE CDA 
The proponents of the CDA argued that "w ithout regulation, the children 
of our nation will be defenseless against the pom ographers and pedophiles" now 
lurking throughout the Intemet.*’ "In addition to protecting the children from 
indecent m aterial" there are the rights of those adults who, through religious or 
moral predilection, do not deserve to be bom barded w ith  obscene and 
pom ographic material."^
Another problem that m ust be considered is the open nature of the 
Intemet. There is simply no crude V Chip solution that we could install that
*' Ibid, 81.
*- Gensler, Marc, and Jay Klug. "Pros and Cons of the CDA and O ther Intemet 
Censorship Bills." 1997. [paper on-line]; available h t tp : / /  w w w .duke.edu/ 
~ m ag l/ procon.html; Intem et; accessed 2 February 1998. 2.
*" Ibid.
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w ould nullify all obscene material in cyberspace. The Intem et is a constantly 
changing mass of information that can appear, disappear, then reappear, under 
different web site titles and headings. This problem  thwarts V Chip technology 
by circumventing certain 'tagged' sites or web-pages altogether. Another 
problem  that was raised was the inability of parents do m uch about it due to 
their lack of understanding of the Intem et on the whole. Generally, children 
know more about computers than their parents do, and w ould probably be able 
to circumvent blocking technology anyway.
Pro-Family groups rightly presume tha t in the untam ed electronic abyss 
known as the Intem et there are people who do  not really care about family 
values. One of the leading advocates of the CDA, Ralph Reed, the former head 
of the Christian Coalition, stated "w e are not asking the court to ban material 
from the Intemet, w e just want our children to be protected from sm ut on  the 
Intem et in their living rooms as they get at the com er drug store or library."** 
Many pro-CD A advocates w am ed that if som e regulation was not attem pted, it 
would be equivalent of giving "every child a free pass to every adult bookstore 
and video store w ith  the click of a mouse."*" O thers argued in favor of keeping 
children away from  harm  in on-line chat groups. New York Assemblywoman 
RoAnn M. Destito argued that pedophiles are "moving from  the playground to
** Ibid.
*5 Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3 4
the Internet."** The CDA advocates stated that when the bill was passed that 
children w ould be protected.
In a letter addressed to Thomas J. Bliley Jr., the Chairm an of the House 
Commerce Com mittee, proponents argued for the "strongest possible criminal 
law provisions to address the growing and immediate problem  of com puter 
pom ography, w ithout any exemptions, defenses, or political favors of any kind 
accorded to those who knowingly participate in the distribution of obscenity to 
anyone or indecency to children."*' This letter was signed by the leading 
advocates for the CDA, including the Christian Coalition, American Family 
Association, Concem ed W omen for America, Traditional Values Coalition, 
American C enter for Law and Justice, Morality in Media and the National Family 
Legal Foundation.**
In several aspects, pro-CD A advocates had several valid points. W hat 
type of society do we live in where pom ography and indecent communications 
can be sent to m inors with imm unity from prosecution? Worse yet, w hat type of 
youth does a society produce w hen they are bom barded w ith the worst aspects 
of the society in which they live in? Is that the future w e w ant to build?
66
67
68
Ibid.
EFF. "Letter to Thomas J. Bliley Jr. Chairm an Committee on Commerce." 16 
October 1995 [letter on-line]; available h t tp : / /  w w w .eff.org/ pub/Censorship 
/Intem et_censorship_biU s/; Intemet; accessed 2 February 1998. 1.
Ibid.
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The leading p roponen t of the CDA was the Christian Coalition, which was 
able to gam er trem endous support through fund raising, letter w riting and  
increased political w eight during elections by voter tum out. Therefore, 
politicians who count on this support simply can 't dismiss it on a whim.
Ironically, the In tem et has given the Christian right added weight by increasing 
the ability of pro-fam ily values activism  through a  number of web-sites and  
pages created for that political niche. Web sites like the Original Responsible 
Speech Page, and Usenet sites like alt. pro-CD A. talk, and the Christian Coalition 
were designed to gam er support and  provide information to the public and  
Congress alike.
"Netparents; Resources for In tem et Parents" page provides a positive 
look at the CDA. Unlike the Christian pages, this page considers altem ative 
methods of censoring unw anted materials. This informative page presented a 
blanket of resources th a t covered the Intem et and Intemet-awareness relevant 
sites. Netparents covered methods such as blocking software, kid-safe access, net 
rating systems, and m ost importantly, educating children themselves about 
responsible use of the Intem et. This web page offered an interesting look at 
w hat private citizens could do about m onitoring w hat was available on their 
own computer. The N etparent page provided the first real look at the new  line 
of blocking software tha t was just becoming available to the public. Program s
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
such as Cyber-Patrol, Cyber Sitter, Net Nanny, and Surf Watch are among the 
m ost used program s for private censoring on the market.*^
The Netparent page also dem onstrated to parents where they may find 
inform ation regarding the objectionable material and why it was considered 
questionable by some viewers. This was a far cry from  the laundry lists of 
m aterial considered obscene by the Christian Coalition. Netparents offered 
altem ative sites like "Disney's Web page, and  the Parent's Guide to Cyberspace 
page provided by the American Library Association."'” Equally valuable to the 
parent were books listed on child-friendly web pages. One of the most 
interesting points of Netparents information were the several rating systems that 
had come about over the Intem et in the last several years. These rating systems 
w ere strictly voluntary, and were to be used by web pages who w ere concemed 
about the material they were sending. These independent third parties rated 
m aterial for people that were concemed about substance content.
There are four major rating systems that are covered by the Netparents 
webpage.
1) The Platform for Intem et Content Selection fPICS).
Netparents. "Resources for Intem et Parents." 31 January 1998. [database on­
line]; available h ttp : / /  w w w .netparents.org/ ; Intem et; accessed 2 February 
1998. 1-2.
Netparents. "Resources for the Intem et Parents." 31 January 1998. [database 
on-line]; available h ttp ://w w w . netparen ts.o rg /resources.; Intem et; accessed 
2 February 1998. 1.
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Technical standards developed by the W orld Wide Web 
Consortium  and the Intem et industry which enable multiple, 
independent, third party  rating systems to operate sim ultaneously 
on the Intemet.
2) NetShepard. A rating system that has labeled over 300,000 
web sites.
3) RSACi. A self-labeling system allowing Intem et publishers
to describe the levels of sex, nudity, violence, and harsh language.
To date, over 35,000 sites have self-rated with RSACi.
4) Safe Surf. A PICS-compatible rating system that has labeled 
over 50,000 web sites. ^
Unfortunately, the m undane academic approach that m ade the Netparent
page so informative also m ade it unattractive. The Christian Coalition w anted
som ething w ith teeth and som ething with w idespread appeal to mobilize their
constituency. Hence, the Christian Coalition's "Contract w ith  the American
Family," released May 17,1995, provided the following three principles that
became a rallying cry for the passage of the CDA. The Restricting Pom ography
doctrine supported three m ain principles:
1. Enactment of Legislation to protect children from being 
exposed to pom ography on the Intemet. 2. Enactment of 
legislation to require cable television companies to completely 
block the video and audio on pom ography channels to non­
subscribers. 3. Am ending the federal child pom ography law 
to make illegal the possession of any child pom ography.^
Netparents. "Resources for Intem et Parents." 31 January 1998. [database on­
line]; available h t tp : / /  w w w .netparen ts.o rg /ra tings/; Intem et; accessed 2 
February 1998. 1.
^ Christian Coalition. "Contract w ith the American Family." 1998 [database on­
line]; available http: //cd t.o rg /p o licy /free sp e ec h /cc_contract_pomo.html; 
Intemet; accessed 2 February 1998. 1.
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The Christian Coalition argued that both soft and hard core pom ography was 
readily available on the Intemet. They believed that a law that followed these 
guidelines w ould provide the kind of protection they sought.
The first of these principles was directed solely against the Intem et. The 
Christian Coalition urged Congress to enact broad legislation to "protect 
children from being exposed to pom ography on the Intem et."^ They stated that 
"criminal law should be amended to prohibit distribution of, or making 
available, any pom ography, soft core o r hard, to children, and  to prohibit 
distribution of obscene hard core pom ography  to adults.'"'*
The Restricting Pom ography doctrine dealt with the Intem et and  it was 
used to sw am p Congress and the W hite House staffers on how  to best couple 
this w ith the CDA . Interestingly enough informative brochures which were 
once bulk mailed and shipped maybe once or twice per one issue due to cost 
concerns now became uploadable and free to all their target districts. They could 
hit each district as many times as they w ished at virtually no cost.
Unfortunately, these messages could som etim es be m istaken for the pulse of the 
general public. Due to the ease of comm unication, repeated messages from a 
handful of individuals could provide the illusion of being a public m andate due 
to their frequency and volume. This w as to be the case for the CDA. These
^ Ibid. 
Ibid.
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messages of concern were to finally find a powerful friend in Senator James Exon 
(D-NE).
Senator James Exon introduced the Com munications Decency Act on 
February 1,1995, in an a ttem pt to finally establish some governm ental 
param eters regulating pom ography over the Internet.'" Senator Exon based his 
legal principle on  the Miller ruling that stated obscene speech did not enjoy First 
Am endm ent protection. In a classic example of leaping before looking, the 
Senate and H ouse attem pted to gam er 'grassroots' support from the vociferous 
Christian Right. Senators and Congressmen alike used this support to push the 
bill quickly through Congress w ithout considering the long-term  Constitutional 
questions tha t m ight rise from  such broad coverage as was dictated in the CDA 
on a relatively new m edium . In order to get his point across about the 
availability of pom ography, during the debates on the bills introduction Senator 
Exon stood on  the Senate floor holding a 'b lue binder' that provided countless 
examples of the worst filth his staff could find on the Intem et.
D uring an  interview w ith the M acNeil/Lehrer N ew sH our on June 22, 
1995, Senator Exon stated that "it is not an exaggeration to say that the worst, 
m ost vile, m ost perverse pom ography is only a few 'clicks' away from  any child
Wilson, Fred. "The Indecency of the Communications Decency Act." 1997. 
[article on-line]; available h t tp : / /  www. isc.rit. e d u / ~sab0276/ 
stv. c d a .h tm /. #dates. ; Intem et; accessed 4 April 1997. 3.
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on the Internet/"* Senator Exon argued that his view of the Intem et was 
analogous to relevant telephone and broadcast law applied by the U.S. courts.
Rep. Chris Cox (R-CA), and Rep. Ron W yden (D-OR) (Intem et educated 
legislators) recommended a bül that advised a go-slow research approach before 
attem pting any regulation on the Intem et. Citing that under the current 
provisions of the CDA, many of the norm al day to day communications held on 
Intem et would be held under the guise of governm ent regulation and  therefore 
encroach upon free speech. This bill however, was quickly sidestepped for a 
harder-stanced approach to w hat was view ed as Exon's discovery of a new era of 
child pom ography distribution via the Intem et.
The CDA stated:
whoever in interstate or foreign communications (A) by means 
of telecommunications device knowingly 1.) Makes, creates or 
solicits and II.) Initiates the transm ission of, any comment, request, 
suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication which is 
obscene or indecent knowing that the recipient of the communication 
is under 18 years of age regardless of w hether the maker of such 
communication placed the call or initiated the com m unication."
Furthermore, the CDA contained stiff penalties of fines as high as "5100,000 and
prison sentences of up to two years on anyone who knowingly exposes minors to
*^ The MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour. "Focus - Sex in Cyberspace?" 22 June 1995. 
[database on-line]; available h ttp :/ /  w w w .eff.org/ pub/C ensorsh ip / Intem et 
censorship b ills/; Intemet; accessed 7 Febm ary 1998. 1.
77 Lewines, Alan. "An Obscenity in Congress: The Communications Decency 
Act of 1996." 1997. [paper on-line]; available h t tp : / /  www. dcez. com / 
~alew ine/cda96/ cda96.html.; Intem et; accessed 26 August 1996. 1-2.
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'indecency' online."^* Passage of the bill would allow Congress to give the 
"Federal Com m unications Commission the power to determ ine w hat is 
'indecent' in interactive m e d i a . T h e  bill did incorporate Cubby Inc. by 
providing a defense clause for Intem et providers. Under section E:l.) "No 
person shall be held to have violated subsection A. or D. solely for providing 
access or connection to or from a facility, system, or network not under that 
person's control."*” Since there was a question of the Constitutionality of the bill, 
a compromise w as reached which stipulated if the bill were challenged it would 
be fast-tracked to an Appellate Court. This jurisprudential nuance enabled Exon 
to pass the CDA.
Although Senator Exon provided the initial steam that was to provide the 
CDA with its Intem et teeth, it was the backing of the Clinton Adm inistration 
which was to propel the CDA into law. The Clinton Adm inistration shared the 
goal of the Christian Coalition "of preventing obscenity from being widely 
transmitted over networks."*^ The Clinton Administration w anted to trv and
’* Dibbell, Julian. "M uzzling the Intemet." Time. (December 18,1995): 75.
Harders, Julie. "Censorship in Cyberspace." Quill. Vol. 83. Iss. 8. (October 
1995): 25.
*” Lewines, "A n Obscenity in Congress: The Com munications Decency Act of 
1996." 5.
CDT. "C linton Adm inistration Concems Regarding S.652: The 
Telecommunications Com petition and Deregulation Act of 1995. " 29 January 
1998. [database on-line]; available h ttp :/ /  www. cdt.org
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help the industry develop legislative solutions for the problems technology 
couldn 't solve. The Administration pointed ou t the that there m ight be "possible 
First A m endm ent issues and privacy considerations" and that it raised legal 
questions that would probably be decided in the Supreme Court.*^ Regardless of 
the debate. President Clinton prom ised the full support and resources of the 
White House on what m ust have seemed tenuous ground.
OPPOSING THE CDA 
"W ith the passage of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, Congress was 
prepared to turn  the Intem et from one of the greatest sources of cultural, social 
and scientific information into the online equivalent of the children's reading 
room."*^ The rallying cry for the anti-CD A forces came from the language of the 
bill itself. The opponents of the CDA claim ed that the broad terminology of the 
bill interfered with First Am endm ent rights.
The argum ents against the CDA w ere already on the way. The bill raised 
harrow ing questions about First A m endm ent rights in the new world of
82
/  policy/ legislation/ adm in s652 comnts.htm l; Intemet; accessed 2 February 
1998. 6.
Ibid.
EFF. "Is This What They Mean by Indecent?" 1998. [database on-line]; 
available h ttp ;/ /  w w w .eff.org/B lueRibbon/ sites.html. ; Intemet; accessed 2 
February 1998. 1.
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cyberspace. "The act is unconstitutionally over broad and perhaps vague, 
because it provides no judicial definitions for the terms 'indecency' and 'patently 
offensive'."*'* Furtherm ore the bill simply repeated existing federal laws that ban 
w hat m ight be considered the strongest sexual material tha t results in public 
outcry, like pedophilia and  bestiality. The bill could be used directly against any 
one individual that the FCC may characterize to be distributing 'indecent' 
material. W hat areas of online communication does this cover? Personal? 
Group? Business? The CDA apparently covered them all. No parameters had 
been placed on the CDA's jurisdiction. The right of protected online speech now 
is pending governm ental approval. Unfortunately, the good intentions of the 
CDA may have disastrous effects in the grey areas of defining 'indecency'; what 
is considered inform ative to some would be indecent to others.
The anti-CD A forces w ere led by the American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU), and  soon m any others followed suit. Organizations like the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation (EFF), Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT), and 
Voters' Telecom W atch (VTW) formed the nucleus of the anti-CD A campaign. 
Much like their opponents, the coalition that stood against the CDA used mail 
w riting cam paigns and other means to raise awareness about problems that the
^  Le wine, Alan. "M aking Cyberspace Safe for Children: A First Amendment 
Analysis of the Com m unications Decency Act of 1996." 1997. [paper on-line]; 
available h t t p : / / w w w .dcez.com /~alew ine/cda96/cdadraft.htm l.#head ingl7. 
; Intemet; accessed 4 April 1997. 5.
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CD A would create. The ACLU and others soon found that the m edium  they 
sought to protect was the perfect way to comm unicate their message.
The EFF started the Blue Ribbon Campaign, designed to do several things: 
first raise awareness about the issue as a whole, inform  Internet users as to the 
contents of the bill, and offered ideas on how to circum vent the law should it 
ever be passed. The Blue Ribbon Campaign quickly gained m om entum  and soon 
was all over the Internet. Online chat groups were started, discussion groups 
throughout the Usenet and hundreds of web pages appeared that supported the 
defeat of the CD A.
Web pages such as Electronic Frontier Foundation Page (EFF) provided 
various articles, editorials, and laws pertaining to the CD A and communications 
law in general. This site also offers an excellent chronology of CD A events.*^
The Center for Democracy and Technology Page (CDT) showed an ongoing 
compilation of the CD A debate, including the actual law and Congressional 
viewpoints.*^ The Voters' Telecommunications W atch was a page dedicated to 
the issues, previous laws and how to register for Internet voter action.®’^
Electronic Frontiers Foundation. 1998. [database on-line]; available 
h t tp : / /  w w w .eff.org/. ; Internet; accessed 2 February 1998.
“  Center for Democracy and Technology. 1998. [database on-line]; available h ttp :/ /  
W W W .cdt.org.; Internet; accessed 2 February 1998.
The Voters Telecommunication Watch. 1998. [database on-line]; available h ttp ://  
W W W .vtw .org/ ; Internet; accessed 2 February 1998.
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Computer Currents Interactive®* and HotW ired provided a new s pages of the 
ongoing debate on the CDA.®^ Dave W iner wrote and m aintained an editorial 
column on the pro's and con's of the CD A.’” Digital Shout was an awareness 
page of w hat rights and privileges w ould be lost if the CD A w as adopted/^ 
Finally, the Digital Doom sday page provided a com puterized clock showing 
when the CDA would go into effect.”
Web pages that had  no affiliation to the Blue Ribbon Cam paign were able 
to download the 'blue ribbon gif' (a gif is a still picture that can be downloaded 
to web-sites) which dem onstrated their opposition to the CDA. The blue ribbon 
was symbolic of the fight against the CDA, and quickly appeared throughout 
cyberspace.
The alert had been sounded. The goals were quickly set, and best 
summarized by a docum ent issued by the EFF. In this pamphlet, the EFF quickly 
summarized the points of contention in the CDA. The EFF m entioned the 
problems w ith the term  'indecency' and noted it was ill-defined. The EFF argued
®® EFF. “The Blue Ribbon Campaign: For Online Freedom of Speech, Press and 
Association.'’ 1998. [database on-line]; available http:// www. 
eff.org/BlueRibbon/sites.html; Internet; accessed 2 February 1998. 3.
Hotivired. 1998. [database on-line]; available h ttp :/ /w w w .hotw ired.com . ; 
Internet; accessed 2 February 1998.
Opsit.
” Ibid.
92 Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4 6
that Congress w as wrong to equate the Internet to a broadcast or telephone 
m edium . The CDA would weaken privacy for any users on the Internet 
regardless of in tent or knowledge of wrongful doing. The CDA would even 
make classic w orks of art and literature illegal for anyone to distribute.”
The EFF quickly realized that the courts m ay just agree because of the 
argum ent along the First Am endment lines. The CDA would have given 
" unconstitutional expansion of federal authority... to the FCC" to regulate 
comm unication that the EFF believed w as fully covered by the First 
Am endm ent.^ Another point of contention show ed that the term  'indecency' 
was far too vague and had never been defined by the Courts or Congress. 
Another failure w as the 'least restrictive m eans' which regulated speech was not 
adhered too. The quality of speech and the heavy punishm ents were 
questionable for the general public.
As the debate raged on several Congressional leaders became actively 
opposed to the CDA. The leading voice of dissent was the Speaker of the House 
Representative N ew t Gingrich (R-GA). In the same M acNeil/ Lehrer news show 
that Senator Exon voiced his support. Rep. N ew t Gingrich raised crucial
EFF. "Your Constitutional Rights Have Been Sacrificed for Political 
Expediency." 1 February 1996. [database on-line]; available 
http: / /  W W W .eff.org /pub/Censorship/...hip_bills/cda_960201_eff.statm ent. 
; Internet; accessed 2 February 1998.
94 Ibid.
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concerns. This bill is "clearly a violation of free speech and it's a violation of the 
right of adults to com m unicate w ith each other, but was 1 think seen as a good 
press release back home so people voted for it,"”  Gingrich alluded tha t the 
Christian righ t w anted to flex their muscles and  mobilize support and  raise the 
awareness of the CDA issue.
Soon a list appeared  of w hat would be banned by the advent of the CDA. 
Web pages that contained w orks of art, literature both informative and  classic, 
support groups, as well as popular entertainm ent could have been a violation of 
the CDA (see Appendix I for complete list).
O pponents of the CDA gained steam w ith their initial principles and the 
laundry list of banned sites. The perceived threat to the First Am endm ent 
brought an outcry from virtually every point on the political spectrum. The Blue 
Ribbon C am paign was used  as symbolic patriotism  for all those not interested m 
the Internet itself but in free speech. This quickly drew the attention of the Press 
and the TV media. Even com puter illiterate people who may not have been 
interested a t first quickly hopped onboard w hen the media 'red  flag' to 
im pedim ent of free speech gained public attendion. The argum ent for the CDA 
gained national scrutiny.
One of the interesting points brought up by the proponents of the CDA 
was the idea of a third party  rating system. This met with quick scepticism by
95 The M acN eil/Lehrer N ew shour, 1.
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the ACLU, which asserted that a "black cloud of private 'vo lun tary ' censorship" 
would be as dangerous as government views of indecency.”  The ACLU W hite 
Paper docum ent proposed six reasons why self-rating system s would be w rong 
for the Internet:
1) Self-Rating Schemes Will Cause Controversial Speech to be Censored.
One of the strongest arguments points ou t that w hoever is running these 
third party rating systems would invariably bring their ow n subjective opinions 
into the equation to determine w hat was controversial and  w hat speech was not.
97
2) Self-Rating is Burdensome, Unwieldy and Costly
These systems w ould require all American sites to be subjected to third 
party systems therefor unfairly subjecting shoe-string web operations of 
individuals to a cost that may well make it untenable for financially strapped 
people to even create web pages.”
3) Conversation Can't Be Rated
Chat room conversations become an interesting point of contention. How 
do you rate an ongoing conversation between two or m ore individuals? Answer,
”  ACLU. "ACLU White Paper: Fahrenheit 451.2; Is Cyberspace Burning?" 31 
January 1998. [paper on-line]; available h ttp :/ /  www. aclu. o rg / 
cyber /  buming.html; Internet; accesssed 2 February 1998. 4.
”  Ibid, 5.
”  Ibid.
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it just can 't be done. You w ould need to subject every chat room to some sort of 
online speech referee w ho could call foul if someone crossed the line.”
4) Self-Rating Will C reate "Fortress America" on the Internet
A self rating system  that is strictly enforced here in this country doesn't 
necessarily cross international borders. There would be a significant portion of 
the web that would go unaffected by U.S. legislation. These sites could regularly 
be accessed within the U.S. by U.S. citizens but carry on indecent speech through 
chat lines open to o ther countries.
5) Self-Ratings, Will Only Encourage, N ot Prevent, Government Regulation
The ACLU argues that any self-rating system by network users just 
encourages the ever intrusive governm ent towards broad measures like the 
CDA. Legislation that Congress does not really have the knowledge to create, or
time to truly investigate, the many facets of what the Internet really means to the 
American public.^"
6) Self-Ratings Schemes Will Turn the Internet into a Hom ogenized Medium 
Dominated by Commercial Speakers
”  Ibid, 6. 
Ibid, 6-7. 
Ibid. 
Ibid, 8.
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Big corporations like Disney would be the only operations able to afford 
the expensive, cumbersome rating system  at all. The exchange of interesting 
concepts and ideas w ould be subject to the w him  of decency. Fascinating 
discussions about AIDS, cults an d  sexually transm itted diseases would be wholly 
elim inated. There w ould be nine thousand channels of on-line communication 
going on and nothing to talk about except the weather.'”
The one category both sides partially agree with is that of parental 
screening with the use of software blocking programs. Teaching one's children 
family values and morals translates into reasonable Internet responsibility. 
A lthough, this, too, has a potentially dangerous check on free speech.
Com panies like Microsoft, who dom inate a huge portion of the software 
industry, would probably set im plied standards by their sheer dominance of the 
software market. People would be again subject to a third party, mega-com puter 
conglom erate setting national and  international standards of decency.
"Black Thursday, February 1,1996, as it is known in cyberspace, was the 
day  the Com munications Decency Act, attached to the Telecommunications Act, 
w as passed by Congress. President C linton one week later signed the bill into 
law, February 8,1996 became know n as the Day of Protest, because thousands of 
Internet sites w ent black in a unified protest" against the CDA.'""
Ibid.
Wilson, Fred. "The Indecency of the Communications Decency Act.", 1.
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The onset of the CDA spurred a series of state-like statutes that tried to 
imitate or expand the CDA. These pretenders tried a m yriad of ways to try and 
improve the already existing obscenity laws and even tried to break new ground 
for state laws in the area of Internet communications (see Appendix II).
A virtual Pandora's box was opened w hen state legislators began to 
imitate their national counterparts. Upon closer exam ination some state 
legislators had already copied existing laws that governed obscenity and  just 
applied them to the Internet these included: California, Hawaii, Maryland, New 
York, N orth Carolina, Oklahoma, Virginia. The other states like Kansas and 
Montana tried to outlaw  images generated by m orph technology software. Yet, 
these indecent pictures were generated ou t of day to day pictures from things 
like people, anim als, and scenery. Oklahoma tried to ban obscene material from 
its state databases altogether. Some states tried to enforce anti-harassm ent laws 
by attem pting to ban electronic transmissions intended to offend whom ever was 
receiving the e-mails. Only Hawaii's Resolution 177 attem pted a go-slow 
approach to try and do any systematic study of w hat exactly state CDA 
legislation w ould  am ount to.
The Congressional rush  to pass the CDA, which was cloaked in the veil of 
pro-family, anti-obscenity, and  anti-child pornography legislation, was 
infringing upon  First A m endm ent rights. Politicians attem pted to ingratiate 
themselves w ith  their constituency by cashing in on the bandwagon effect that
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led to the CDA. The rush to pass the CDA alm ost robbed the new  arena of 
cyberspace crucial First A m endm ent protection. Most of the state laws that 
mimicked the CDA were well intentioned but like their national counterpart they 
w ere generally over broad.
Opponents of the CDA m entioned that upon closer exam ination these 
state laws shared the CDA's problems. Fortunately, some states w eren 't as 
im petuous as their neighbors; Massachusetts, Oregon, Pennsylvania, 
W ashington considered bills bu t declined to pass them. This was a hopeful sign 
that legislators who considered the broad ramifications of mini-CD A bills knew 
they were unconstitutional. There were brighter signs ahead.
A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION 
ACLU & EFGA v. Georgia (1996), was the first attem pt to prove that 
legislative regulation on the Internet was excessive. An association of plaintiffs, 
led bv the " ACLU and a civil liberties organization called Electronic Frontiers 
Georgia (EFGA), filed suit on September 24,1996 to have a Georgia law 
overturned. This lawsuit provided the first challenge to the new  federal law 
regulating the Internet outside of the context of indecency issues."'”  This law 
prohibited distribution of inform ation along two lines. First it "prohibited the
Faber, Joseph F. "Regulation of the Internet: A Lesson in Reaching Too Far.' 
1996. [article on-line]; available h t tp : / /  w w w .cyberlaw .com /regint.htm l; 
Internet; accessed 26 August 1997.1.
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transmission of any information by anyone who does not fully identify 
himself."'”  Secondly, it "prohibits the 'u se ' of any trade name, registered 
trademark, logo, legal or official seal or copyrighted symbol, w ithout permission 
from the owner, in a m aimer that would suggest that such permission has been 
obtained."'”  A lthough the first provision of this law tried to prevent fraud by 
prohibiting false names and had good intentions it is fraught w ith First 
Am endm ent conflicts. Prohibiting anonymity chafes against the very nature of 
protection of the m inority's opinion from the majority's wrath.
Unfortunately, there are also technological-legislative gap problems that 
conflict w ith  application of this law to the Internet. The various e-mail accounts, 
chat groups and Usenets operate under the cloak of anonymity. Some of the 
largest netw ork servers such as America Online, CompuServe, Prodigy, and 
Netcom use nicknames, numbers, pseudonyms or a combination of both when 
using e-mail and online chat applications. W hether this is by choice or because 
two users have a name conflict, it still was criminal under the Georgia law. 
Criminalizing information that is obtained or transm itted under the guise of 
these nicknames turns the entire communications process through the Internet 
into a crime.
There may be legitimate reasons w hy the user w ants to go unnoticed or
Ibid, 2. 
Ibid.
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rem ain anonymous. "The subject m ay be embarrassed or politically incorrect, 
o ther users in a discussion area m ight not speak freely if they had to identify 
them selves, or the user m ight be som eone well known w ho desires anonym ity in 
o rder to participate m ore freely."'”
The second part of this law w hich stipulates the use of trade nam es, and 
com pany logos is just a copy of cu rren t copyright laws. The legislature's failure 
to com prehend the inner-workings of the Internet, and failed to conduct the 
fundam ental research on  the new interactive process it brings to communications 
w ere the reasons this bill was so fundam entally wrong in the two areas it 
crim inalized. This case provided a pulse on how the Judicial system after closer 
research w ould not join the bandw agon euphoria and m ay view the CDA for 
w hat it truly represented a First A m endm ent issue.
Another case that showed the court's leanings w as American Library 
Association v. Pataki (1997). "The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 
N ew  York analyzed the impact of Internet content regulations by asking 
w hether they represent impermissible overreaching by one state into the 
regulatory affairs of other states, thus violating U.S. principles of federalism ."'”  
ALA V.  Pataki consisted of 15 plaintiffs "suing the state of N ew  York over its
108 Ibid.
Loundy, David. "Internet Speech Cases Cinch Broad Freedom." 10 July 1997. 
[database on-line]; available h t tp : / /  w w w .leepfrog.com /E-law /
CDLB/  Free_Speech.html; Internet; accessed 2 February 1998.
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recent legislation, which essentially, makes it a felony to knowingly make certain 
material which is harm ful to minors available via 'any  computer communication 
system.'""* This language was very similar to the CDA, although on  a state 
level. As Reno v. ACLU  (1997) was to point out, Internet users may not 
necessarily know  the ages with all those they are communicating. The Court 
stated:
The unique nature of the Internet highlights that a single actor 
m ight be subject to haphazard, uncoordinated, and even outright 
inconsistent regulation by states that the actor never intended to 
reach and possibly was unaw are were being accessed. Typically, 
states jurisdictional limits are related to geography; geography, 
however is virtually meaningless construct on the Internet.
The menace of inconsistent state regulations invites analysis 
under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, because that 
clause represented the framers' reaction to overreaching by the 
individual states that might jeopardize the grow th of the nation- 
and in particular, the national infrastructure of communications 
and trade - as a w hole.'"
The court correctly assumed that due to the nature of the Internet.
Internet traffic allowed for New York e-mail between one New Yorker and 
another m ight get routed  through a series of states such as Massachusetts or 
Connecticut and  that this conflicted w ith other states authority over their own 
citizens. Online chat room s also proved to be a problem, because there was no 
way to assure that all participants are from one state, or even one country.
"* Ibid. 
" 'Ib id .
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The New York District Court acknowledged several factors that made the 
legislation concerning the Internet difficult. First w as the question of 
jurisdiction, because the Internet knows no boundaries and no one state could 
legislate for the entire Internet or just that of their ow n geographic borders. 
Second, the court found the legislation violated the Commerce Clause because 
the Act attem pts to regulate interstate commerce at "too great a burden  to justify 
the minimal benefits it produces."" ' Finally, the court argued that because of the 
commerce clause, the Internet, "can only reasonably be regulated a t the national 
level."'" The court argued that some form  of a national lowest-common- 
denominator standard of regulation had to be set and  since only the Supreme 
Court had the authority to do this and had not show n any such signs, the New 
York District Court bowed out.
THE THREE PANEL APPELLATE COURT 
Through a special provision w ithin the CDA, it was able to get fast- 
tracked to any appellate court to determ ine any judicial im propriety that the bill 
may represent. The governm ent did not have to w ait long. The CDA was 
challenged almost imm ediately after its passage w hen in February 1996, "the 
ACLU, American Library Association, and  such companies as America Online
"-Ibid.
'"Ib id .
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and Microsoft joined together in attem pt the to overturn  the C D A ."'" The 
plaintiffs w anted to ensure the Internet w ould be a protected m edium  of speech. 
The only w ay they could do this was to apply protection given to the printed 
word and thereby remove the Internet from the area covered by the 
Communications Act of 1932. "The time is ripe for this court to select the correct 
analogy for cyberspace. Secondly, the proper analogy for cyberspace is print."''"
There was no surprise why the ACLU chose the three-panel Philadelphia 
Appellate Court. All three judges had provided various broad First Amendment 
support throughout their individual histories. This time they would be ruling 
the application of the First Am endment to a whole new  form of communication. 
The ACLU provided the three judges w ith every law student's initial dream; the 
ability to create brand new  jurisprudence on a Constitutional matter.
This time the three Federal judges took a m onth and a half to familiarize 
themselves w ith the Internet before taking action. "O n W ednesday June 12,
1996, in a unanim ous decision, the judges ruled that the CDA would 
unconstitutionally restrict speech on the Internet."''*
Mendels, Pamela. "Judges visit cyberspace sites in suit over an indecency 
law." The Nezv York Times. Vol. 145. (May 12,1996): 12(L).
"ACLU V Reno (1996)." 1996. [database on-line]; available h t tp : / /  www. 
spectacle.org; Internet; accessed 20 May 1997.
"* Faber, 7.
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The three judges cited many problem s with the CDA.
Judge Sloviter stated:
"Internet communication is m ore akin to telephone communication, 
at issue in Sable, as w ith a telephone, an Internet user m ust act 
affirmatively and deliberately to retrieve specific information online.
I believe that 'indecent' and 'paten tly  offensive' are inherently vague, 
particularly in light of the governm ent's inability to identify the relevant 
com m unity by whose standards the material will be judged." '
Interestingly Judge Buckwalter raised a new issue that the CDA brought
into question:
All parties agree that this statute deals with protected speech.
The CDA attempts to regulate protected speech through criminal 
sanctions, thus implicating not only the First A m endm ent but also 
the Fifth Am endment of our Constitution... The concept of due 
process is every bit as im portant to our form of governm ent as is 
free speech."*
Judge Dalzell went further than the other two by proclaiming: the 
"Internet is a far more speech-enhancing m edium  than print, the village green, or 
the mails, because it has characteristics of transcendent importance.""* 
Furtherm ore the Internet "is the most participatory form of mass speech yet
Losey, Ralph C. "Selected excerpts from  ACLU v. Reno Decision." 1996. 
[article on-line]; available h ttp :/ /seam iess.com /rcl. ; Internet; accessed 2 
February 1998.1.
"*Ibid, 2.
"*ACLLZn. Reno (1996), 10.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
5 9
developed, the Internet deserves the highest protection from governmental
intrusion."'^*
REACTIONS TO RENO v. ACLU  
Despite the fact that Reno v. ACLU  struck dow n the CDA, the battle lines 
were redraw n for round  two. President Clinton who lead the support for the 
CDA, stated,
I rem ain convinced, as 1 was w hen 1 signed the bill, that our 
Constitution allows us to help parents by enforcing this Act 
to prevent children from being exposed to objectionable 
material transm itted through com puter networks. I will 
continue to do everything 1 can in my Administration to give 
families every available tool to protect their children from these 
materials.'^'
After the heated debate and research conducted by the Appellate Court, 
Senator Jim Exon denounced the three-judge panel by stating that, "the CDA 
made it illegal to transm it or make available indecent material to children. From 
the beginning, we felt th a t the best chance for a considered opinion would be in 
the US Supreme C ourt and  that's where the final decision will be m ade.
Losey, 2.
The White House. Office o f the Press Secretary. "Statem ent by President Clinton 
in reaction to C ourt Decision." 12 June 1996. [article on-line]; available 
h t tp : / /  ww w.ciec.org/decision_PA /960612_Q inton_stm nt.htm l; Internet; 
accessed 4 April 1997.
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Hopefully, reason and common sense will prevail in the Suprem e Court.
Exon argued two points w ith the courts ruling. First, "the Philadelphia court 
found that there were no effective measures to determine the age of computer 
users. The court overlooked the fact that a num ber of Internet sites already block 
child access by requiring credit card or adult PIN num bers to access certain 
sites."'”  Exon stated that the indecency standard was defined by the long 
history of jurisprudence, and  that the "indecency standard is sufficient and it has 
been repeatedly upheld in the Supreme C ourt." '"
The evolution of the written w ord  analogy becomes evident w hen looking 
at all the cases in their entirety. In Cubby v. CompuServe libel is addressed to 
m ean which printed words were whose responsibility. US v. Baker & Goncia the 
judge referred to the students stories as fantasy writings not designed to threaten 
anvone. Furthermore in Religious Technology Center v. Amaldo Paglianni Lemia 
(1995), a judge ruled that confiscating a com puter was similar to confiscating a 
printing press. Early in cyber-law cases throughout the 1980s provided sloppy 
handling by defense lawyers, and the failure to examine the First Am endment 
argum ent. By the 1990s lawyers were coming up to par w ith the technological
Exon, James, Senator. "Statement on  C ourt Ruling on Decency Act." 12 June 
1996. [article on-line]; available h ttp :/ /w w w . dec. o rg / decision _
P A /960612_Exon_stmnt.html. ; Internet; accessed 26 A ugust 1997. 1.
Ibid, 2. 
Ibid.
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lingo of the Internet and the tide slowly turned w hen US v. Baker & Gonda was 
recognized for w hat it was a First Amendment issue. Eventually the mini-CD A 
represented in ACLU & EFGA v. Georgia would not survive scrutiny under the 
anonymity argum ent of the First Amendment, paving the way for Reno v. ACLU 
when the w ritten  word analogy was fully employed.
The opposition to the CDA applauded unanimously when the decision hit 
the media. Senator Russ Feingold (D-WI) proclaimed, "this is welcome news for 
all of us w ho not only support free speech, but who also w ant to see this new, 
dynamic communications technology develop safe from the threat of 
censorship."'”  Other leading voices included Rep. Christopher Cox (R-CA) who 
had tried to introduce the go-slow approach. "I hate to say I told you so. But I 
did. Today's ruling is no surprise—the CDA is fraught w ith constitutional 
problems."'^* Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) said, "let no one be confused—this is 
NOT a victor}^ for child pornography or indecent material—but instead a victory 
for the First Am endm ent.'”  Rep. Rick White (R-WA) offered that, "The CDA
Feingold, Russ. Senator. "Press Release from Senator Russ Feingold." 12 June
1996. [article on-line]; available h ttp ://w w w . ciec. o rg / decision
_PA /  960612_feingold_stmnt.html. ; Internet; accessed 2 February 1998. 1.
Cox, Christopher. US Congressman. "Statement from Rep. Christopher Cox." 
12 June 1996. [article on-line]; available h ttp :/ /  w w w .ciec.org/decision 
_PA /960612_cox_stmnt.html. ; Internet; accessed 26 August 1996. 1.
Leahy, Patrick, Senator. "Press Release from Senator Patrick Leahy." June 12, 
1996. [article on-line]; available h t tp : / /  www.ciec. org/decision_PA 
/  960612_leahy_stmnt.html. ; Internet; accessed 26 August 1996. 1.
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debate sent a pretty clear signal that m any members of Congress are lost in 
cyberspace. The bottom  line is that w e're never going to get good laws until we 
get our legislators up to speed on Internet issues."'”
The CDA represents a gross overreaction on the part of the governm ent, 
and  is not at all in tune w ith the "jurisprudence on the First A m endm ent that 
speech regulation laws m ust pass the 'least restrictive means' test" as noted in 
Sable Comm v. FCC (1989).'”  What is worse, the CDA granted broad and 
sw eeping powers to the FCC to determine w hat is 'indecent' m aterial. Surely, 
our founders never sought to have one governm ent institution regulate any sort 
of free speech, regardless of good intentions.
As previously discussed there are alternatives to the CDA w ithout relying 
on governm ent regulation. Private industry has created a m yriad of watchdog 
program s that limit access to certain Web sites. "Surf Watch blocks access to well- 
know n sites dedicated to sexual m aterial."'”  However, program s like 
"Cybersitter provides the parents with the option of choosing block, block and
White, Rick. US Congressman. "Press Release from  Rep. Rick White." 12 
June 1996. [article on-line]; available.http://  www.ciec. o rg / decision_PA 
/960612_W hite_stmnt.html. ; Internet; accessed 14 July 1997. 1.
"Making Cyberspace Safe for Children: A First A m endm ent Analysis of the 
Com munications Decency Act of 1996.", 5.
"A  Solution." 1997. [article on-line]; available h t tp : / /  w w w .public.asu.edu/- 
la n g l/solution2.html; Internet; accessed 2 February 1998. 3.
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alert, or simply alert them  w hen access to certain sites have been attem pted ."" ' 
"NetNanny provides a  list of obscene words and  phrases, and forces the system 
to stop dow nloading m aterial w here these are found."'”  All these options are far 
more acceptable than governm ental intrusion, because these alternatives allow 
for the private individual to oversee the developm ent of their children as they 
see fit w ithout the governm ent intrusion.
Proponents of a sm aller bureaucracy also stand against the CDA. If the 
CDA were constitutional there would need to be a myriad of new agencies 
designed for the single purpose of scanning the Internet for these 'indecent' 
people lurking ou t there in cyberspace w aiting to leap at the opportunity  to grab 
cyber-smut. At w hat poin t w ould they stop looking? Personal e-mail? Accounts 
transactions were sent through? Where w ould the intrusion end?
The CDA also copied already existing laws that prevent pornography and 
have already been successful a t regulating Internet pornography. Instead of 
creating legislation like the CDA, perhaps legislators should consider the laws 
already in place.
The concept of 'com m unity standards' that were brought up  in Miller 
needs to be redefined. As I have reviewed Robert & Colleen Thomas w hat was 
found descent in the com m unity they lived (California) was found indecent in a
Ibid.
Ibid.
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community (Tennessee) that ordered from them. This failure to recognize the 
Internet's ability to create a new community w ithout state lines or boundaries 
created double jeopardy for determ ining w hat is 'indecent' using differing 
comm unity standards (in this case state). This allowed the governm ent to go 
forum shopping for convictions through various communities where 'indecent' 
is more to their approval. This hardly seems just.
The Internet represents the future of communications because of its 
spontaneity and global applications. Legislators should be w ary of regulating 
w ithout researching the possible avenues that the Internet entails. In the case of 
the CDA, thankfully, the court system  provided a bridge between the legislative- 
technological gap as was shown by Congress in formulating the CDA. By 
investigating exactly what the Internet has to offer, the three judge panel in Reno 
V .  ACLU  saved freedom of expression over the Internet. The Suprem e Court 
would settle the future of Internet communication.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTERS
BACK TO COURT AGAIN: ATTORNEY GENERAL 
JANET RENO v. ACLU (1997) A CASE SUMMARY 
AND CRITIQUE
The Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA) began as a 
governmental attem pt to regulate various forms of indecent speech over the 
Internet. Unfortunately, what started off as a well-intentioned bill aim ed at the 
Cyber-pom ography industry quickly shifted into overly-broad legislative 
language that would have endangered select consensual individual 
communications. The CDA was immediately overturned by a three-judge 
federal appellate panel in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for being too broad and 
vague. There was a question as to the clarity w ith the 'indecent' and 'patently 
offensive' clauses that would crirninalize consensual adult conversations held via 
the Internet.
In July, 1997, the Supreme Court struck dow n the CDA in a 9-0 vote in 
what national press hailed as a quintessential step paving the way for free speech 
laws into the 21st century. Justice Stevens delivered an insightful majority
65
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opinion to the decision m aking of the C ourt's stand. Justice O 'Connor w rote a 
dissent in part for the 9-0 vote, she was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist 
providing fascinating remedies that may allow for the 'son ' of CDA to become 
constitutional where its predecessor failed.
This chapter will cover why the C ourt found the CDA unconstitutional 
and w hat the argum ents w ere leading to that decision. Since the Suprem e 
C ourt's landm ark ruling further attem pts to try new angles of Internet 
censorship have occurred. There will be an  overview of the continuing CDA- 
type legislation and what their possible affects could impose.
THE COURT'S OPINION 
"A t issue is the constitutionality of two statutory provisions enacted to 
protect m inors from indecent and patently offensive communications on the 
Internet," Justice Stevens stated in the opening of the majority opinion.'”  He 
agreed w ith the District C ourt's description of the character and dim ensions of 
the Internet. Justice Stevens acknowledged the "availability of sexually explicit 
m aterial in that m edium ," '"  and  recognized that users require some
Citizens Internet Empowerment Coalition (CIEC). "A ttorney General Janet Reno 
V. ACLU (1997): Justice Stevens Opinion of the Court." 29 June 1997. 
[database on-line]; available h t tp : / /  w w w .ciec.org/sc_appeal/ 
opinion.shtm l. ; Internet; accessed 14 July 1997. 1.
134 Ibid.
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responsibility w hen they are retrieving information from  the Internet, but there 
are problems "confronting age verification for recipients of Internet 
com m unications." Justice Stevens recognized the District Court's findings that 
"ten 's of thousands of users are engaging in conversations on a huge range of 
subjects,"'”  and  that it is "no  exaggeration to conclude that the content on the 
Internet is as diverse as hum an thought."'”  "From a publisher's point of view, it 
constitutes a vast platform  from  which to address and hear from a w orld wide 
audience of m illions of readers, viewers, researchers and  buyers. Any person or 
organization w ith  a com puter connected to the Internet can 'publish' 
information."
Justice Stevens realized the necessity for a decision about a m edium  that 
has "as m any as 8,000 sexually explicit sites on the W orld Wide Web alone at the 
time of the hearing, and the num ber estim ated to double every 9 months.""* 
Although this dilem m a is troubling from the governm ent's perspective, more
Ibid.
"* Ibid, 3.
Ibid.
"« Ibid, 4.
"* ACLU. "Transcript of Suprem e Court Oral Argument. Online. Cyber- 
Liberties." 29 June 1997. [article on-line]; available h ttp : / /w w w . aclu. org / 
issu es/cy b er/tr ia l/ sctran.html. ; Internet; accessed 29 June 1997. 2.
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problems arise w hen trying to censor the Internet w ith  over broad language like 
'indecent' and  'patently offensive'.
The governm ent argued that current screening technology is inadequate 
because although it "enabled parents to acquire software that blocks out certain 
suggestive w ords and known sexually explicit sites," these program s can not 
currently "screen for sexually explicit images," increasing the need for 
government-based regulation like the CDA."* However, Justice Stevens agreed 
w ith the District Court's finding that all evidence dem onstrated that certain 
programs do screen suggestive words or know n obscene sites, and furtherm ore, 
adequate software is being developed "by which parents can prevent their 
children from  accessing sexually explicit and  other material which parents 
believe is inappropriate for their children.""'
Justice Stevens adm itted that the age verification requirem ent of the CDA, 
which criminalizes knowingly transm itting 'indecent' m aterials to a m inor was 
woefully inadequate. "The governm ent offered no evidence that there w as a 
reliable way to screen recipients and participants" in arenas like e-mail, mail 
exploders, news groups and chat rooms.'”  The only feasible way offered by 
either side was credit card verification. This m ethod was ruled out for several
"* “Justice Steven's Opinion", 5. 
Ibid.
142 Ibid.
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reasons. First, "using credit card possession as a surrogate for proof of age 
would impose costs on non-commercial Web sites that w ould require many of 
them to shut down."^"*^ Furthermore, "at the time of the trial credit card 
verification w as effectively unavailable to a substantial num ber of Internet 
content providers."^"*^ "Moreover, the imposition of such a requirem ent would 
completely bar adults who do not have a credit card and lack the resources to 
obtain one from  accessing any blocked material.""^
One suggestion offered by the governm ent was the use of a password 
system which could be used to ensure individual age verification. The feasibility 
of this type of technology provides similar problems to the credit card 
verification system. The "District Court found that an adu lt password 
requirements w ould impose significant burdens" on the sam e non-commercial 
sites covered in credit card verification, and  the costs of such systems would 
push m aintaining sites out of the reach of the common user. "Even if credit 
card verification or adult passw ord were implemented, the Government
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
'•*" Ibid, 6.
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provided no testim ony on how such systems" could in fact ensure the user w as 
actually over eighteen."'
Justice Stevens noted Judge Buckwalter of the District C ourt correctly 
concluded "the term s 'indecent' and  'patently offensive' w ere so vague that 
criminal enforcem ent of either section would violate fundam ental constitutional 
p r i n c i p l e s . H e  "found no statutory basis for the governm ent's argum ent that 
the challenged provisions would only be applied to pornographic materials, 
noting that obscenity, unlike indecency, has not been defined to exclude the 
w orks of serious literary, artistic, political or scientific v a l u e . " J u d g e  DalzeU, of 
the District Court, recognized tha t the "act w ould abridge significant protected 
speech, particularly by non-commercial speakers."
The governm ent tried to argue that the CD A is constitutional under the 
precedent of three previous cases decided before the Supreme Court. These 
cases are Ginsberg v. New York (1968), FCC v. Pacifica Foundation (1978), and 
Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc. (1986). However, upon closer examination Justice 
Stevens argued these "raise doubts—rather than relieves doubts—concerning
Ibid. 
Ibid, 8. 
Ibid, 8-9. 
>5° Ibid, 9.
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constitutionality of the CDA."'^^ In Ginsberg, the C ourt upheld the 
constitutionality of a N ew  York statute  that prohibited selling to minors under 17 
years of age m aterial that was considered obscene to them even if not obscene as 
to adults. The C ourt decided that "constitutional freedom of expression is 
decided by the individual w hether they are an adu lt or a minor. Furthermore 
the prohibition against sales to m inors doesn 't bar parents from  buying it for 
their kids a n y w a y . J u s t i c e  Stevens stated that this is a significantly narrow er 
aspect than portrayed in the CD A. He stated that the CD A does not adhere to 
this constricting category for three reasons. First, the CD A does not require the 
parent's consent or even their participation in engaging in dialogue that is 
criminal in the statute. Secondly, the New York statute in Ginsberg applied to 
commercial comm unications, but the CD A doesn 't have any limitations. Third, 
Stevens argued  the "utterly  w ithout redeem ing social importance for minors" 
clause in Ginsberg clarifies w hat is considered indecent to children.'^  The CD A 
doesn't provide any definition or any particularity of what is indecent.
In Pacifica, the "filthy words" dilem ma arose when a monologue delivered 
in the afternoon was adm ittedly 'paten tly  offensive'. It was noted that broadcast
Ibid, 10. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Ibid.
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medium s place particular program m ing a t certain times of the day, which would 
then be "permissible to air such a program  in that particular m edium ."'^  Justice 
Stevens noted that in the Pacifica case, there had been a framework in use for 
decades which set precedent in regulating broadcast radio and television. 
However, under the present conditions of the CD A, it asked the "C ourt to define 
'indecent' transmission that w ould justify criminal p ro se c u tio n ."P o ss ib ly  the 
most im portant aspect that Justice Stevens raised in the Pacifica analogy is the 
question of history. Broadcast m edium  have historically been limited in the view 
of the First Am endment protection, but the Internet has no similar history.
In Renton, the Supreme C ourt upheld zoning ordinances that kept adult 
movie theaters ou t of residential neighborhoods. The court was more concerned 
about subsequent effects of the movie theaters than the content of the movies, 
such as crime and property devaluation. The governm ent argued that the CD A 
was constitutional because it established some sort of ‘ajberzoning' on the 
Internet as it applies to 'indecent' and 'patently offensive' material.
Nevertheless, the CD A applied to the entire universe of cyberspace. Justice 
Stevens indicated the purpose of the CD A was to protect children from the 
'indecent' material, not control the secondary effects that Renton was conceived 
under. Under the current purview  of the CD A, all questionable content is
Ibid, 11. 
Ibid.
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"subject to blanket restriction, and cannot be properly analyzed as for time, 
place, and maimer regulation.
The governm ent's quintessential argum ent for Internet regulation was the 
broadcast analogy. The governm ent said sexually explicit m aterial was widely 
available and should be subject to some governmental regulations. Likening 
the Internet to radio or television, the government could draw  upon the history 
of regulation of broadcast media. The broadcast standards were set because of 
the 'invasive' nature of radio  and television communications in Sable 
Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC (1989). However, the C ourt found the 
"Internet is not as 'invasive' as radio or television."^'’® In fact the Internet 
"requires a series of affirmative steps more deliberate and directed than merely 
turning a d ial," '”^  or sw itching on your radio or TV. There m ust be some 
affirmative action on the part of the information seeker to get a t the indecent 
material that resides on the Internet. Yet, unlike broadcast m edium s the Internet 
"users seldom  encounter such 'indecent material' accidentally. A docum ent's 
title or a description of the docum ent will usually appear before the docum ent 
itself, and  in many cases the user will receive detailed information about a site's
Ibid. 
Ibid, 12. 
Ibid, 13.
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content before he need take the step to access the document. Almost all sexually 
explicit images are preceded by w arning as the content."^®”
W hen Congress first enacted laws regulating the radio and television 
spectrum  it was viewed as a scarce comm odity. Justice Stevens noted that the 
Internet p rovided "relatively unlimited, low cost capacity for communication of 
all k i n d s . A s  per testimony provided during  the oral arguments of this case 
"as m any as forty million people use the Internet today, and that figure is 
supposed to expand to two hundred m illion by 1999."^*^ The Supreme C ourt 
agreed w ith the findings of the District C ourt that the "content on the Internet is 
as diverse as hum an thought."
Justice Stevens noticed that the governm ent thought Miller (1973) was no 
m ore vague than the CD A. But Justice Stevens argued that the three pronged 
test that was established in Miller can not hold up to the test. Miller contained a 
critical elem ent that the CD A lacks, a definition of w hat is 'indecent'. Miller 
stated  the m aterial was "specifically defined by the applicable state law."^^
More im portantly the Miller case provided two other narrow ing features to test
Ibid, 12. 
Ibid, 13. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Ibid, 15.
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the obscenity definition. W hen tested the material considered as a whole m ust 
appeal to the "p rurien t interest" and that if it "lacks of serious literary, artistic, 
political, o r scientific value critically limits the uncertain sw eep of the obscenity 
definition."^®" Unlike the 'indecent' or 'patently offensive' clauses in the CD A, 
Miller narrow ed the definitional criteria by providing the three step test for any 
'indecent' material th a t is questioned.
The 'com m unity standards' question raised in Miller as applied to the 
"Internet means that comm unication available to a nation-w ide audience will be 
judged by the standards of the community most likely to be offended by the 
message."'®® This is sim ilar to the double jeopardy analogy in Thomas.
The governm ent's final argum ent was that if the CDA was not 
constitutional as is, then  the Supreme Court could tailor the statu te so as to make 
it constitutional as by honoring the statutes severability clause. The Court does 
have a history of this tailoring m easures when deem ed to "lim it construction on 
a statute only if it is 'read ily  susceptible' to such a construction."'®' However the 
"open ended character of the CDA provides no guidance w hatsoever for limiting 
its coverage."'®® Justice Stevens stated that it was not the Suprem e Courts duty
'®5 Ibid.
'®® Ibid, 17. 
'®’ Ibid, 21. 
•®® Ibid.
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to alter laws to make them constitutional, as that should be done during the 
statutes inception at the legislative level.
Justice Stevens concluded that the governm ent may not "reduce the adult 
population to only what is fit for children."'®’ Stevens contended that the 
breadth of coverage attem pted by the CDA is "wholly unprecedented."''® 
Furthermore, the CDA "lacks the precision that the First Amendment requires 
w hen a statute regulates the content of speech. The CDA effectively suppresses a 
large am ount of speech that adults have a constitutional right to receive and 
address to one another, and the CDA would torch a large segment of the Internet 
com m unity."'^
DISSENT IN PART 
Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, wrote an interesting 
dissenting opinion. The basis behind Justice O 'Connor's argum ent was that 
despite "the soundness of its purpose, the portions of the CDA are
'®’ Ibid, 16. 
Ibid, 17. 
Ibid, 20.
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unconstitutional because they stray from the blueprint of our prior cases have 
developed for constructing a 'zoning law ' that passes constitutional m uster."'^  
Justice O 'Connor argued that if the CDA w as redrafted to narrower 
param eters and attem pted to follow the Courts adherence to the 'adult zones' 
doctrine that the statu te could be constitutional. Justice O 'C onnor stated 'zoning 
laws' are "valid if 1) It does not unduly restrict ad u lt access to the material and 
2) minors have no First Amendment right to read o r view the banned 
m aterial."'^
Justice O 'Connor conceded that as the Internet exists today in 1997, the 
"display provision and some applications of the 'indecency transmission' and 
'specific person' provisions" fall far short of w hat was i n t e n d e d . " U n l i k e  the 
Court, however" Justice O 'Connor said it "would invalidate the provisions only 
in these circum stances."'^
She adm itted that the 'display provision' could not pass muster.'"® That to
ABC Neios. "A ttorney General Janet Reno v. ACLU (1997): Justice O 'Connor's 
Dissent in of the Court." 29 June 1997. [article on-line]; available h ttp ://  
W W W . abcnews. com /sections/ sc itech/cda_opinion/d issent/ index.html. ; 
Internet; accessed 20 July 1997. 1.
Ibid, 2.
Ibid.
Ibid.
'"® Ibid, 5.
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do so under the auspices of the CDA, the speaker would sim ply have to refrain 
from using 'indecent' language, because there w ould be no guarantee that 
minors w ould not be listening. Justice O 'C onnor recognized that Ginsberg breaks 
dow n w hen adu lt conversation occurring in a chat room is in truded upon by a
177minor.
Justice O 'Connor argued that 'zoning law s' are a feasible alternative 
which w ould bring new life to the CDA. The precedence of 'zoning laws' was 
currently "valid only if adults are still able to obtain the regulated speech."''® In 
Ginsberg, the "N ew  York law  created a constitutionally adequate 'adu lt zone " 
that Justice O 'Connor believed the Court did no t question.'^ Justice O 'C onnor 
m entioned that the Court had  only considered laws that operate in the physical 
world, w ith two m easurable characteristics that create 'ad u lt zones': geography 
and identity.'®® These characteristics allow for institutions to know where they 
can reside and who may enter them.
Justice O 'Connor stressed that similar zoning param eters could be 
successfully applied to the Internet. "Cyberspace undeniably reflects som e form 
of geography; chat rooms and Web sites, for example, exist a t fixed locations on
Ibid, 7. 
Ibid, 2. 
Ibid, 3. 
'*® Ibid.
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the Internet."'®' She further emphasized that "cyberspace is malleable", thus it 
would be possible to "construct barriers that screen for identity, m aking 
cyberspace m ore like the physical world and consequently more amenable to 
zoning laws."'®^
She based this zoning premise on the ongoing use of 'gatew ay' 
technology. Such technology requires the Internet users to enter information 
about them selves" such as ID numbers or credit card numbers.'®' Nevertheless it 
has been stated that this current technology is far too expensive for ordinary 
noncommercial sites at present, the flux of the Internet generates new  technology 
availability at a far more accelerated rate making this technology accessible in the 
not-to-distant future. However, this 'gatew ay' technology has no t been adopted 
by m ost of the Net, and under current circumstances it is not economically 
feasible for m ost Web site supporters.
Justice O 'C onnor stipulated that "user based zoning is still in its infancy. 
For it to be effective it m ust: 1) have an agreed upon code or 'tag ' w ould have to 
exist; 2) screening software or browsers with screening capabilities would have 
to be able to recognize the 'tag '; and 3) those program s would have to be widely
Ibid, 4.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8 0
available—and widely used—by Internet users."'®* At this tim e Justice O 'Connor 
adm itted this is a long way off.
Justice O 'Connor rejected the argum ent about the CDA being "facially 
over broad."'*® Justice O 'Connor argued that the precedent of the C ourt has 
required real proof to "show some over breadth, such as in Broadrick v. Oklahoma 
(1973), and the appellees have not carried their burden in this case."'*®
Justice O 'C onnor pointed out that the appellees in no fashion "cited 
examples of speech falling within the 'patently  offensive'" category.'®^ More 
importantly, the "CDA might deny minors the right to obtain material that has 
some 'value' is largely beside the point."'®® Justice O 'Connor believed that 
although "discussions about prison rape, and  nude art have some redeem ing 
educational value for adults, they do not necessarily have any such value for 
minors."'®’ Justice O 'Connor concluded by stated the CDA in her opinion, "does 
not burden a substantial am ount of m inors' constitutionally protected speech."'’®
Ibid, 5. 
'®® Ibid, 9. 
'®® Ibid.
'®' Ibid. 
Ibid, 10. 
Ibid. 
Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
81
Justice O 'C onnor's final disagreement about the C ourt's opinion 
depended upon the burden of proof that rested with the appellees to show some 
over breadth as to prove CDA's 'blanket effects'. In one aspect Justice O 'Connor 
is right, w hen show ing any amount of over breadth the appellees m ust be able to 
provide specific examples to draw  upon. Fortunately, CDA was never actually 
enacted before appealed to the Federal Court. Therefore, there are no actual 
cases to cite w here Web sites were deem ed 'indecent' to show  "see this is what 
we meant by the CDA being far too broad." Justice O 'Corm or failed to consider 
that the CDA is a punitive law thereby anyone accused under the CDA the 
burden of proof falls to the defense rather than the prosecution. This 
contradictory nature of the law falls short of the spirit in which any criminal 
statute is conceived.
In conclusion, the very name Com munications Decency Act is a slap in the 
American public's face. This bill's title simply says we, the legislators, do not 
trust you the individual to regulate yourself and teach your children accordingly 
in regard to free expression with regards to the newest m edium  - the Internet.
The Suprem e C ourt's refusal to define what indecency or patently 
offensive could have rem edied some of the initial com plaints w ith the CDA. 
Proponents of the CDA took advantage of the C ourt's am biguity and pressed 
forward w ith possibly the most dam aging bill to the First Am endm ent in 
American history. Even though the C ourt provided a m yriad of tests (Chaplinsky
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to Miller) which incrementally made it m ore difficult to challenge w ritten  
m aterial in the Courts the 5-4 ruling in Miller showed that even the C ourt itself 
w asn 't clear w hen it came to definitions like 'patently  offensive' or 'com m unity 
standards'.
Chapter one discussed the competing theories on First A m endm ent over 
the obscenity issue. Chapter one also show ed the inadequacies of the w ay in 
which the Suprem e Court had  addressed the issue of defining exactly w hat 
obscenity meant. In a slew of Supreme C ourt cases from  Omplinskij (1942) to 
Miller (1973) the C ourt has struggled to define obscenity and even created a 
series of tests in order to show  what obscenity meant. Unfortunately, w ith every 
step to attem pt to solve these problems the Court created new problems to 
consider, such as community standards and  terms like patently offensive, and 
indecent. More importantly, chapter one developed a case fram ework for 
understanding the privileged speech debate over questionable speech such as 
obscenity.
The incremental effect of all these rulings produced more questions than 
answers and allowed legislation like the CDA in the first place. The Suprem e 
Court itself realized that any all encom passing absolute standard is dangerous. 
Issues like obscenity subtly change w ith the generational standards adopted  with 
the passing of time.
This definitional ambiguity allowed for various perspectives on  w hat
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should be and w hat ought to be considered questionable material. This haze 
surrounding obscenity allow ed the CDA and sim ilar state bills to be as over­
broad as possible and still receive the support of the uneducated masses.
In the second chapter, the CDA proponents first noted tha t the Internet 
was m ore akin to broadcast analogy than  to the w ritten  word. Therefore, the 
governm ent argued it could provide broad regulation when it came to 
comm unication over the Internet. At the time before the CDA w as challenged 
proponents of the CDA sta ted  that self-imposed rating  system s and private 
censoring software just w as not sufficient to deal w ith  the flood of obscenity and 
pornography that could be found at the quick click of a m ouse button.
Several cases changed how the Internet w as perceived by both the Courts 
and the public. Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc. (1991), U.S. v. Robert & Colleen 
Thomas (1992), U.S. v. Jake Baker & Arthur Gonda (1995), ACLU & EFGA v. Georgia
(1996) and  ALA v. Pataki (1997). These cases provided an educational 
springboard for the Courts on the technological issues created by the Internet. 
This informed decision m aking showed promising results for Reno v. ACLU
(1997). W hen it was realized that the Supreme C ourt relied heavily upon the 
Three Panel Appellate C ourt's research, it was no t surprising to find out how  
they ru led  in July 1997.
Reno (1997) puts to rest a m yriad of questions that started  with the CDA's 
inception. Justice Steven's opinion correctly stated the problem s with the
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governm ent's sweeping attem pt to deal w ith  the 'indecent' material on the 
Internet. There were several points raised that should be covered for better 
com prehending the reasoning behind the C ourt's decision.
The lynch-pin of the governm ent's argum ent rested on the broadcast 
analogy. If the C ourt found that Internet w as similar to the broadcast medium 
then the CDA would have a sound historical framework for initiating the 
restrictions that the CDA envisioned. This argum ent was not new by any means. 
In Cubby, Inc., and Jake Baker & Arthur Gonda, the Internet was first recognized as 
som ething very unique in realm  of communications. In fact, Internet e-mail in 
this case was analogous to the printed w ord which has always received the 
highest form of protection from the Court. The Court realized that the very 
unique and unprecedented nature of the Internet does not include the 'invasive' 
nature that Sable recognized in radio or television. The user must have a 
com puter and secondly be hooked into the Internet. The 'affirm ative action' 
intent of the user thoroughly contradicts this 'invasive' nature. Furthermore, 
once dismissing the idea that the Internet is not considered a scarce resource, the 
governm ent's premise of treating the Internet something akin to the broadcast 
m edium  falls flat on  its face. Therefore, the Court can consider the Internet in its 
true form without adhering to the past history of regulation.
Screening software used by individual families like 'N etnarm y' and 
'Surfwatch' offers a stop-gap answer to the ongoing cyber-pom  issue. The best
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
85
answ er for on-line 'indecency' regulation isn 't governm ent involvement but 
instruction and education at the family level. Screening program s offer families 
a choice. None of the programs are totally effective, but they're a start. Both 
sides adm it that screening through software is a viable alternative, and far less 
im posing than the shotgun effects of the CDA statute.
Age verification techniques such as credit cards and passwords ensure 
that freedom  of expression on the Internet comes to those who can afford it. First 
A m endm ent protection does not read 'for those wishing to state something 
questionable please insert your credit card and  await verification.' This totally 
absurd system begs the question: "w hen is governm ental regulation too much?" 
The Internet allows people from all walks of life and parts of the globe to express 
their views. There is an ongoing historic m ovem ent for closing the gap on 
current borders and ancient cultural m istrust and the Internet is part of that 
movement. O ur govenunent should welcome rather than shun steps that ensure 
continued freedom of exchange of thoughts to prom ote this ongoing process.
The C ourt's opinion also addressed the Miller question. The confining 
param eters of the Miller test show why the C ourt was able to use Miller to 
disprove the governm ent's argum ent. Once this final contention is ousted the 
governm ent withdrawals to its fall back position.
The governm ent's 'cut & paste' premise show ed that even the lawyers 
arguing the case recognized problems with the CDA's language. The only
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reason this card was played was an attem pt to salvage som e part of the statu te  
they could, by severing the unconstitutional parts. This supposition w as rejected 
by the C ourt stating that statutes be far more clearer w hen attem pting to ban 
sections of First A m endm ent speech. In short "do your research before you write 
som ething that is so broad as to be questioned by everyone."
Justice O 'C onnor's opinion raised an interesting poin t about 'ad u lt 
zoning'. Her assum ption was based on the two characteristics that m ake zoning 
possible; geography and  identity. Yet these two characteristics dem onstrated 
Justice O 'Connor's ow n unfamiliarity with the Internet. She argued that there 
are fixed points that re^ d e  on the Internet itself (IE. chat room s, web sites etc..), 
however, this is not entirely true. Only some sites can consistently be found 
under the same name or subject. The very nature of the Internet was alw ays 
changing certain aspects of where things are found and under what titles they 
will be found. For instance, if you go to a site for fishing advice, a m onth from 
now tha t same site m ay be under a different name, or doesn 't exist outright. 
Justice O'Cormor w as right in that the Internet is malleable, but she w ould  try 
and create boundaries where none exist and none were m eant to exist. The only 
viable alternative w ould be to zone areas of subject matter. This type zon ing  in 
itself w ould  fit under the blanketing effects that found the CDA unconstitutional, 
and w ould  not effect sites that rem ained outside of the physical boundaries of 
the US.
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The second characteristic of zoning is identity. Throughout this case both 
sides conceded the difficulty in identifying just who is who on the web. The 
whole prem ise of age verification becomes m uddled in the am biguous arena of 
the Internet. It was impossible to ascertain ages of participants in  chat rooms, 
and news groups that have a 'revolving door' procedure. The communications 
were always on-going and  the entire group isn 't going to stop every time 
someone new  comes in. One possible approach was to host your ow n chat 
rooms or post your ow n news groups: that way the individual becomes the filter 
for the type of conversations and information that is covered. Thus taking 
regulation out of governmental hands and placing them  in the individuals 
m aking it far easier and  less intrusive than w hat the CDA envisioned.
Another problem w ith identity is the questions raised in ACLU & EFGA v. 
Georgia (1996). There was the moral question that the individual does deserve 
some anonymity. This stems from individual concerns of privacy as people 
m ight not w ant their names associated with the m aterial being discussed. 
Celebrities, field experts, or politicians could post to the Internet and not worry 
about consequences of their stands. Information that was based on the education 
or the age of the participant may be assigned to an  irrelevant status even though 
the inform ation provides insight or is factually sound.
W hat does a peek into the looking glass reveal? Reno provided a 
prom ising start to a history of judicial protection that the new m edium  of the
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Internet deserves. This precedent should set a theme to build upon for future 
cases regarding cyber communications. There was still a potential for future 
'sons' of the CDA to come creeping through the legislative plain. Justice 
O 'Connor pointed out, if future statutes are more precise in their w ording 
coupled w ith better understanding of the Internet format, it would be possible to 
imagine that the a newer law would be far harder to kill than the current CDA. 
This time we were lucky. Unfortunately, the more familiarity legislators gain 
w ith the Internet the more particular their scope of 'indecent' and 'patently  
offensive' will become. The First Amendment was the m ost cherished of the Bill 
of Rights, it is the first ones our founding fathers considered and have 
continually provided unparalleled protection for. Technology is continually 
expanding communication applications. The First A m endm ent should be 
viewed through technologically transparent lenses.
POST RENO V.  ACLU  STANCE 
In a post-CD A sum m it that was held on October 15 - 16,1997 supporters 
of the CDA scrambled to find possible alternatives in light of the Suprem e 
Courts finding in Reno v ACLU. Among the chief participants were leading 
advocates of "online privacy and security experts, as well as parent and  library
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groups."'’'  This m eeting was organized by the White House as an attem pt to 
pick up the shattered pieces of the CDA changed their approach to favor 
supporting a possible rating system  to the Internet. However, this would be 
strictly voluntary by the web operators and Internet service providers.
Proponents of this new wave of activism continued to believe that the 
Internet is a  place where the enorm ous amounts of obscene material continue to 
be available to just about anyone logging on to the Internet. This time 
proponents of CD A-type legislation have retraced their steps and are proceeding 
on a more toned dow n strategy shown by the Netparents page. Answers that 
were once only considered stop-gaps and insufficient have now been embraced 
by the pro-CD A forces such as self-imposed ratings systems and software 
blocking program s have gone to the forefront of their campaign.
W hen Senator James Exon retired, new congressional members like Rep. 
Bob Goodlatte (R-VA) took up the pro-CD A campaign. He stated "the Supreme 
Court has now given Congress a very clear guide" on how to proceed with 
future CDA-like legislation.'’  ^ O thers like Senator Charles Grassley (R-IO)
Gelsi, Steve. "Post-CD A Sum m it Planned." 31 January 1998. [article on-line]; 
available h ttp : / /  w w w .forbes.com /tool/ h tm l/97 /Ju ly  /angles_0730 
/sununit.h tm l; Internet; accessed 2 February 1998. 1.
CNN. "W hat's Next in W ashington? Reno v. ACLU: The Battle Over the 
CDA." 31 January 1998. [article on-line]; available h t tp : / /  www. 
com /U S/9703/cda.scotus.beyond.cda/what.next.html. ; Internet; accessed 15 
February 1998. 1.
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believed that "our objective hasn 't changed. Some way, somehow, we will have 
to find a constitutional way of protecting kids from the pom  the way we did for 
printed m aterial." '’®
The pro-CD A backers simply outlined their new plan of attack. They 
believed clearer language, better technological understanding of the Internet, 
and targeted enforcement on  objectionable sites w ould play key roles in making 
a more w orkable CDA.
A new  bill proposed by Senator D an Coats (R-IN) is the 'son of the CDA'. 
This new bill would make it  illegal "to display material 'harm ful to minors' on 
Web sites potentially accessible to m inors."'”  Furthermore, the text was edited 
so that "pornographic images or text depicting 'patently  offensive'" defined by 
"actual or sim ulated sex., or lewd exhibition of the genitals" was considered 
unlaw ful.'’" Anyone violating this law w ould be subject to stiff penalties of up 
to S50,000 fine and six m onths in jaü. Unlike the previous legislation, the new 
Coats bill w ould exclude m aterial which has literary, artistic, political or 
scientific value. The new bill would also exclude the previously contended chat 
rooms.
193 Ibid.
Seminerio, Maria. "CDA Back from the Dead?" 14 Novem ber 1997 [article 
on-line]; available h ttp :/ /  www.zdnet.com  /z d n n /  content/ 
zd n n / 1114/241745/htm l. ; Internet; accessed 2 February 1998. 1.
Ibid.
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Coat's staffers argued  that "compliance w ith the bill's requirem ents could
be m et with instituting cred it card-based age verification."*’® Nevertheless, the
Supreme C ourt noted in Reno that age verification w as an unnecessary burden to
most Web site operators. Senator Dan Coats believes this bill has enough clarity
to pass judicial muster. The ACLU contended that the 'harm ful to minors'
clause was about as m uddled  legalese has the previously defeated bill. ACLU
lawyers argue that "harm ful to m inors- is a censorship standard half-way
between 'obscenity' and  'indecency'" leaving the content of w hat the bill outlaws
as much in dispute as the CDA did.'”^
Coat's supporters believed that legislating independent blocking software
and rating system s may be the way to go. One possible recipient of this
legislation w ould  be public libraries that have been a growing access point for
the American public in the last seven years. In anticipation of any attem pt to
further the life of the CDA, the ALA issued a statem ent on their position:
Libraries are places of inclusion rather that exclusion. C urrent 
b locking/ filtering software prevents not only access to w hat 
some m ay consider 'objectionable' material, but also blocks
196 Ibid.
EFF. "Censorship - Internet Censorship Legislation & Regulation (CDA, etc.) 
Archive." 31 January 1998. [database on-line]; available h t tp : / /  www. 
eff.org/pub/C ensorship/Intem et_censorship_bills/ ; Internet; accessed 28 
January 1998. 1.
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information protected by the First Amendment. The result
is that legal and useful material will inevitably be blocked.*’®
Since the Supreme Court's ruling every possible advocate group has been 
reinvigorated to resist all new First Am endment legislation intrusions to the 
Internet. The Supreme Court's ruling also affected all the state pretender bills 
that sprouted up because of the CDA.
However, this time pro-CD A advocates lacked their one time powerful 
ally. Ira Magaziner, a senior domestic policy advisor to the President has hinted 
that Clinton would veto CDA-like bills in the wake of the Supreme C ourt's 
decision. The initial White House support was crucial for the original CDA to 
become law, and w ithout further White House backing any like-minded 
legislation, will not even have a chance to succeed.
The Supreme Court has m ade its mark on applying the broadest 
protection of the First Amendment to the Internet in Reno. The Suprem e C ourt 
ruling will stand well into the next century as the cardinal rule when applying 
First Amendment questions to the application of the Internet.
ACLU. "ACLU White Paper. Fahrenheit 451.2: Is Cyberspace Burning?" 31 
January 1998. [paper on-line]; available h t tp : / /w w w .aclu.org 
/  issues/cyber/buming.html. ; Internet; accessed 2 February 1998. 10.
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APPENDIX I 
WEB SITES BANNED BY CDA
Art:
Venus de Milo:
h ttp ://w w w .paris .o rg /M usees/L ouv re /T reasu res/gifs/ venusdemilo.gif.
The Sistine Chapel:
h t tp : / /  w w w .oir.ucf.edu/ w m / p a in t/a u th / michelangelo/michelangelo.creation. 
Michelangelo's D avid:
h ttp ://fileroom .aaup.uic.edu/F ileR oom / im ages/ image201.gif.
M adonna and Child with Saint Tohn the Baptist:
h ttp ://c ac .p su .e d u /~ m td l2 0 /p a lm e r/o therw orks/tosini.madonna.html.
The Birth of Venus.
http: / /  w w w .sou them .com /w m /pain t/au th /bo tice lli/venus/venus.jpg . *”  
Literature:
Mark Twain's The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn:
http: /  /  w w w .w onderland.org/ W orks/ M ark-Twain/ huckleberry/.
The Scarlet Letter:
http: /  /  w w w .w 3.org/ hypertext/ DataSources /  bySubject/ L iterature/G utenberg 
/e tex t92 /.
The Jungle: http
: /  /  w w w .w 3.org/ hypertext/ DataSources/ bySubject/ L iterature/ G utenberg/ etex 
t94/.
EFF. "Is This W hat They M ean by Indecent?", 2.
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O edipus Rex:
h t tp : / /w w w .w 3.org/hypertex t/D ataSources/bySubject/L iterature/ Gutenberg 
/e tex t9 2 /.
The Catcher in the Rye: h ttp ://w w w .sta rdo t.com /~ lukeseem /hoIden / 
Support groups:
Lesbian.org. An online Usenet resource center for lesbians.
Christianity and Homosexuality Home Page: Ironically, a C hristian Right page 
that explores cures for homosexuality.
Problems Faced by Homosexual Youth. Trials about grow ing up gay. To help 
minors come to term s with their sexual preference.'"^
The Survivor's Hom epage: http: /  /  w w w .nebula.net/~m aeve/survs.htm l.
The Crossover Network's Homosexuality Discussion from a conservative 
Christian viewpoint: h ttp ://w w w .vnet.ne t/u sers/c rossnet/d ilem m a.h tm l.
Cay and Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation: h ttp :/ /  w w w .glaad .org /.
Discussion on Prozac: now here is a pretty tam e topic to be banning, 
h t tp : / /pharm info .com / d ru g d b / pro_arc.html#arc_proz_28.
Popular Entertainment:
Alanis Morissette, Hole, Pearl Jam, Radiohead, Smashing Pum pkins and The 
Rocky Horror Picture Show: http: / /  w w w .seas.upenn.edu/~averon/lyrics.
Movies written and directed by Quentin Tarantino:
h t tp : / /  w w w .m ca.com / m ca_records/am p3/ pu lpm ovs/movies.html.
Ibid. 
Ibid, 7. 
Ibid, 8.
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Even a Hom epage titled The Tihad to Destroy Bamey: 
h ttp ://deep th t.arm ory .com /~ deadslug /Jihad /jihad .h tm l.'”
Miscellaneous sites:
FCC V.  Pacifica & Cohen v. Califbmia: The first case contains George Carlin's seven 
dirty words, Cohen is a sum m ary of indecent language. 
h ttp ://w w w .ac lu .o rg / cou rt/ courtl.
Playboy - Tanuary 1996. Perfectly legal until now. http /  /  :www.playboy.com.'"^
Roe V.  Wade (1973). Covers indecent material, as well as all related documents, 
h t tp : / /  w w w .law ..com eU .edu/supct/ classics/ 410usll3.ovr.htm l.
Water Birth Inform ation: http: / /  w w w .w ell.com /user/karil/.
The Holy Bible, King lames Version. Sodom and  Gamora. Solomon 4:5. http
://
w w w .w 3.org/ h y p ertex t/ D atasources/ bySubject/ L iterature/ Gutenbery /  etext92 
/ -
The Safer Sex Page. Includes Lesbian Safer Sex Guidelines. 205
The STD Home Page. Inform ation about Sexually transm itted diseases, http 
/  /:m ed. w w w .b u .ed u /people/sycam ore/ std.std.htm .'”
Breastfeeding Articles and  Resources:
h ttp //  :w w w .islandnet.com / ~bedford/  brstfeed.html.
How to Use a C ondom . Meant for highschoolers. 207
203 Ibid, 4.
Wilson, Fred. "The Indecency of the Communications Decency Act." 1997. 
[article on-line]; available h ttp ://_w w w . isc. rit.edu /~sab0276 / stv.cda. 
html.#dates. ; Internet; accessed 4 April 1997. 6.
Ibid, 7. 
Ibid, 8.
207 Ibid, 9.
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APPENDIX II
NEW INTERNET STATE LAWS OF 1995 AND1996
California
Assembly Bill 295, enacted Sept/ 96 
Sponsor: Rep. Baldwin
"Expands obscenity and child pornography statutes to prohibit transmission of 
images by computer."
Connecticut
House Bül 6883, enacted June/95 
Sponsor: House Committee on Judiciary
"Creates criminal liability for sending an online message 'w ith  intent to harass, 
annoy or alarm  another person.'"^"
Florida
Senate BiU 156, enacted May/96 
Sponsor: Senator Burt
"Am ends existing child pornography law to hold owners or operators of 
com puter online services explicitly liable for perm itting subscribers to violate the 
law."
Georgia
House Bill 163, enacted April/ 96
"Criminalizes the use of pseudonyms on the Net, and prohibits unauthorized 
links to web sites with trade names or logos."
House Bill 76, enacted Ju ly /95 
Sponsor: Rep. Wall
"Prohibits online transmission of fighting w ords, obscene or vulgar speech to
Gensler Marc and Jay Klug. "Pros and Cons of the CD A and  Other Internet 
Censorship Bills." 1997. [paper on-line]; available h ttp :/ /  w w w .duke.edu 
/-m a g i/p ro c o n . html.; Internet; accessed 2 February 1998.1.
96
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
9 7
minors, and  inform ation related to terrorist acts and certain dangerous 
weapons."
Illinois
Senate Bill 747, enacted Ju ly /95 
Sponsor: Senator Dudyez
"Prohibits sexual solicitation of a m inor by computer."
House BiU 3622 
Sponsor: Rep. Winkel
"Amends Crim inal Code to include threat by com puter in the definition of 
intimidation." Spurred by Gonda case.
Hawaii
House Bill 2665 
Sponsor Rep. Aki
"Expands statute that prohibits 'prom oting pornography' to include electronic 
transmission."
House C oncurring Resolution 177 
Sponsor: Rep. Arakaki
"Requests that Attorney General study and recommend legislation to protect 
minors from online pornography."'^"
Kansas
House BUI 2223, enacted M ay/ 95
"Expands child pornography statute to include computer generated images." 
M aryland
House BUI 305 /  Senate BUI 133, enacted M ay/96 
Sponsor: Rep. M urphy
"Amends chUd pom  law to include online communication."
House BUI 619 
Sponsor: Rep. Rosenberg
"Prohibits the use of e-mail to annoy, abuse, torm ent or embarrass other 
persons."
Senate Bill 163
Ibid, 2. 
Ibid, 3. 
-"Ib id , 2.
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Sponsor: Senator Norman Stone
"Expands 'harm ful to m inors' law to prohibit exhibition of such m aterial by 
com puter transmission."
Montana
H ouse Bill 0161, enacted M arch /95
"Expands child pornography statute to prohibit transmission by com puter and 
possession of com puter-generated child pornographic images."'^'
N ew  York
Senate Bill 210E, passed Ju ly / 96 
Sponsor: Senator Sears, Rep. DeSitto
"Criminalizes the transmission of 'indecent' materials to minors.
Assembly BUI 8509 
Sponsor: Rep. Sanders
"Expands harassm ent law to include harassm ent over com puter networks." 
North Carolina
H ouse BUI 207, enacted Ju n e / 96 
Sponsor: Rep. Bowie
"Expands existing law to prohibit sexual solicitation of a minor by a computer." 
Oklahoma
House BUI 1048, enacted A p ril/95 
Sponsor: Rep. Barry
"Prohibits online transmission of m aterial deem ed 'harm ful to m inors'."
House C oncurrent Resolution 1097, enacted M ay /96 
Sponsor: Rep. Paulk
"Directs all state agencies, including educational institutions" (universities as 
weU), "to rem ove all iUegal obscene m aterial from their com puter systems."
Virginia
Senate BiU 1067, enacted M a y /95 
Sponsor: Senator Calhoun
"Expands existing statute to criminalize electronic transmissions of chUd
Ibid, 3. 
Ibid, 2.
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pornography."™
House Bill 9.
Sponsor: Reps. Marshall and O'Brien
"Requires online service providers to label 'sexually explicit content on their 
systems."-'^
Ibid, 3. 
Ibid, 4.
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